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 This research serves as an evaluation of the United States’ Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP) strategy in combating militant Islamist groups.  Department of Defense doctrinal 
publications are the authority in this thesis for defining PSYOP.  The research considers past 
U.S. employment of PSYOP to demonstrate its plausible effectiveness in achieving national 
security objectives.   Analysis supports the idea of PSYOP being an appropriate means to 
combat militant Islamism.  A thorough look into the authoritative texts that militant Islamist 
groups use to support their ideology leads to the conclusion that the U.S.’s current 
employment of PSYOP is misdirected and subsequently ineffective.  The researcher 
concludes that an alternative approach involving the use of PSYOP to discredit the militants’ 
stated ideological source, namely the Quran and Hadith, rather than attempting to simply 
discredit their interpretation of the texts, would be more effective in influencing adversarial 
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CHAPTER I  
 
INTRODUCTION - A BATTLE OF IDEOLOGIES 
 
In light of new information, ideas can be supported, stifled, or replaced.  Assuming 
the recipient of new information is capable of reasoning to logical conclusions, clearly true 
information should supplant clearly false information and a change of mind – a change of 
ideas – should occur.  The war against Al Qaeda, the Islamic State (IS) and other likeminded 
groups is ultimately a war of ideologies – systems of ideas and ideals.  Harmful, violent 
“ideologies are not defeated with guns; they are defeated by better ideas and [a] more 
attractive and more compelling vision.”1  This was the sentiment promoted by former 
president Barak Obama in the summer of 2015 after consulting with military leaders at the 
Pentagon. The then Commander in Chief recognized that the real target in the war against 
terror was not one that could be eliminated with bombs or guns; it was one that lay within the 
mind.  Ideas can live on even after the brains that produced them cease to function.  An 
adversarial ideology, simply a set of ideas counter or opposed to one’s own, cannot be 
bombed out of existence; it must be thoroughly discredited and replaced.  Since the 
beginning of the century the United States has been at war with militant Islamist ideology.  
The 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlighted the undermining, inhibiting, 
                                                          
Policy Review 
 
1 “Iraq-Syria solution will need more than bombs and boots,” The Christian Science Monitor, Last modified 




and countering of a specific ideology as an essential element for success in the war on terror.2  
This is true regardless of which group is espousing the ideology in question because the 
ideology or worldview espoused by all militant Islamist groups is one which strives for the 
global establishment of Islam and the supremacy of Islamic law.3   
In the years following the attacks of 2001, “special teams at U.S. Treasury identified 
[Bin Laden’s] funding sources and, one by one, cut them off [and] Special Forces found, 
killed or captured his commanders, including the 9-11 mastermind himself, Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammed.”4  Through a combination of targeted airstrikes assisted by the successful 
recruitment of spies inside the terrorist group’s network, Al Qaeda’s leadership became so 
depleted “that it lacked the ability to plan and prosecute large-scale attacks.”5   This 
eventually led to a significant milestone in the United States’ success against Al Qaeda – the 
death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011.  While the organizational effectiveness of Al Qaeda was 
significantly reduced, the group’s ideology and the violence that stemmed from it continued 
to thrive through its affiliates.  This fact reveals that the war on terror is not simply a 
manhunt.  Al Qaeda and like-minded groups are not fueled by one man, but by a system of 
ideas – an ideology.  Therefore, focusing efforts on one or even on multiple key individuals 
will not overcome the ideology that fuels terror.  Killing Osama Bin Laden did not end the 
                                                          
2 Barak Obama. National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011, Retrieved from 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf> 
 
3 Anthony Celso. Al-Qaeda’s Post-9/11 Devloution: The Failed Jihadist Struggle Against the Near and Far 
Enemy.  New York: Bloomsbury, 2014  Pg 15 
 




5 Ibid., para. 7 
 
3 
war against the ideology that fueled Al Qaeda, which is now led by Ayman al-Zawahiri.  In a 
similar way, killing Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and bombing the self-proclaimed Caliphate out of 
existence will not end the war against the ideology that fuels the Islamic State.  The 2018 
Summary of the US National Defense Strategy concedes that despite the defeat of IS’s 
physical caliphate, “terrorism remains a persistent condition driven by ideology.”6  The 
United States must thoroughly discredit the ideology that unites these militant Islamist 
groups.  Herein lies the greatest failure of the United States’ war against militant Islamist 
ideology; the United States has failed to develop and execute to the extent of its capabilities a 
successful counter-ideological strategy.  A successful strategy is not necessarily defined as 
militant Islamists completely forsaking their religious ideology; a strategy would be 
considered successful if it generated enough doubt in the minds of the militants that, while 
having not completely forsaken their ideology, they are less motivated to kill and die for it. 
In the same way that cancer is not eliminated simply by cutting out a tumor, militant 
Islamist groups will not be defeated by simply cutting out their leadership or even by 
destroying the majority of a group’s resources.  While such events may lead to a temporary 
repose in terrorist activity and a subsequent change in a group’s name, the set of ideas that 
compels these groups will continue to spread like cancer.  Cancer cells have to be destroyed 
wherever they have spread and measures must be taken to keep the cancer from returning.  
Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter suggested that the same holds true for the system of 
                                                          
6 James Mattis. “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.” Department 




ideas that fuels militant Islamist groups.7  In the given analogy, the cancer cells are the ideas 
that motivate the militant Islamists.  We do not have enough resources (personnel, time, 
bullets, bombs) to eliminate every individual who adheres to militant Islamist ideas.  
Therefore, we must relentlessly attack the ideology itself.  Fredrick Kagan, a former 
professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, explained that 
while some enemies must be killed and others captured, the overwhelming majority must be 
persuaded.8   Large scale destruction and death is often enough to persuade an adversary to 
abandon its ideas and aspirations.  However, with their perceived divine mandate, militant 
Islamists are different.  What is needed is a psychological persuasion campaign which exerts 
influence on militant Islamist attitudes and beliefs by appeals to logic and reason, resulting in 
unshakeable doubt which subsequently quells their militant behavior.9  The United States’ 
PSYOP efforts against militant Islamist groups have failed to elicit sufficient doubt and 






                                                          
7 Terri Cronk. “Carter Outlines Counter-ISIL Campaign Plan in Paris.” DoD News, Defense Media Activity. 
Jan 21, 2016. < https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/643943/carter-outlines-counter-isil-campaign-
plan-in-paris/> 
 
8 Frederick W. Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” Policy Review, 120 (2003). 
<users.clas.ufl.edu/zselden/Course%20Readings/FKagan.pdf> 
 








Following a review of current literature, the research begins by evaluating past U.S. 
PSYOP persuasion efforts in order to assess the validity of such efforts and determine 
whether or not they are appropriate in the battle against militant Islamism.   It serves, 
therefore, to show the utility of PSYOP in overcoming an adversarial ideology.  It focuses on 
the equally injurious ideology of Soviet communism and highlights how psychological 
operations were employed to thoroughly discredit the Soviet ideology and assist in the 
ultimate collapse of the Soviet state.   
A proper persuasion campaign must be founded on a proper understanding what one’s 
adversary truly believes as well as a proper understanding of the professed foundation upon 
which those beliefs are built.  In order to propose a successful counter-ideological message, 
one must have robust and accurate knowledge of the targeted ideology.  Therefore, after 
discussing the utility of psychological persuasion campaigns, the research moves into a 
twofold methodology.  First, in order to develop a clear understanding of what the Islamic 
State and likeminded groups believe, this research will explore the militants’ own self-
published literature, namely Dabiq and Rumiyah.  The magazine series Dabiq is the Islamic 
State’s first of such magazines in which the militants depict the group as they see 
themselves.10  In addition to boasting of victories, detailing life in the Caliphate, and 
                                                          




encouraging its supporters, Dabiq explains the beliefs of the Islamic State in the simplest 
terms while asserting the validity of its understanding or interpretation of authoritative texts 
in order to build the group’s legitimacy throughout the Muslim world.  In a similar fashion, 
Rumiyah “puts forward the group’s political and theological stance, explaining why 
opposition to the group is heretical.”11  This part of the research will allow the reader to 
clearly identify what IS and other likeminded militant Islamist groups consider to be their set 
of core beliefs.  It would be a waste of effort in ideological warfare to refute something that 
one’s adversary does not believe in the first place. 
The second phase in this research methodology involves gaining a clear 
understanding of the foundation upon which militant Islamists claim their ideology – their set 
of core beliefs – is built.  In the spirit of Renaissance humanism and the cry of “ad fontes” 
(“to the sources”), this part of the research will require a deep dive into the actual 
authoritative sources that, as claimed by militant Islamists themselves, support their ideology.  
Just because a person or group claims inspiration from a certain source, it does not 
necessarily follow that they indeed are consistent with, or in compliance with, the supposed 
source of inspiration.  Therefore, this section will aim to answer the question of whether or 
not groups like IS are consistent in their worldview.  The results of this research should set 
the direction of any psychological operationss campaign unleashed against militant Islamists.  
The logic behind this phase of research is as follows:  
Group [X] possess beliefs [A] and acts according to those beliefs (against U.S. interests) 
- [X] claims [A] is supported/inspired by recognized authority [Z] 
- Teachings of [Z] clearly contradict [A] and concomitant behavior/actions 
 
 
                                                          
11 Clarion Project. “Islamic State’s (ISIS, ISIL) Horrific Magazine.” Sept 2014. 
https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/  
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Psychological Operations Tactic:  
- Refute misconceptions of Group [X] by revealing error in beliefs [A] via an appeal 
to authority [Z], ideally resulting in a change of behavior in line with U.S. interests 
 
Or 
Group [X] possess beliefs [A] and acts according to those beliefs (against U.S. interests) 
- [X] claims [A] is supported/inspired by recognized authority [Z] 
- Teachings of [Z] appear to support [A] and concomitant behavior/actions 
 
Psychological Operations tactic:  
- Refute authority [Z] (show it to be false); behavior resulting from beliefs [A] 
subsequently loses its justification/validity; Group [X] loses members due to apathy 



















REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Stephen C. Coughlin’s thesis, To Our Great Detriment: Ignoring What Extremists 
Say About Jihad, submitted to the faculty of the National Defense Intelligence College, 
considers how the Intelligence Community determines “what motivates and animates the 
enemy in order to clarify the jihadi threat.”12 The author argues that U.S. authorities and 
decision makers have a faulty understanding of the nature of the enemy and his declared 
strategic doctrine.  Coughlin’s thesis aims to answer three questions: 1) Why have we failed 
to do a doctrine-based threat assessment? 2) What is the doctrinal basis of the jihad threat? 3) 
How can we come to understand the jihadi threat?13  Coughlin concludes his research by 
suggesting a methodology to design a counterterrorism approach without specifically 
proposing an approach.  Furthermore, his only mention of information related capabilities (ie. 
PSYOP) is attributed to the enemy’s use of such capabilities.  The utility of Coughlin’s work 
to this current research paper is rooted in his reliance on authoritative Islamic sources which 
he uses to demonstrate how militant Islamists justify their beliefs and behavior. 
In his paper titled A National Strategy To Win the War Against Islamist Terror, 
Michael McCaul outlines a counterterrorism strategy in light of the United States’ failure to 
secure a decisive victory against a threat that is not defined by “a specific group, but rather a 
worldwide movement driven by an insidious ideology and with an evolving mix of 
                                                          
12 Stephen C. Coughlin, “To Our Great Detriment: Ignoring What Extremists Say About Jihad.” National 
Defense Intelligence College. ( 2007), p 2 
 
13 Ibid., p. 3    
9 
combatants and adherents.”14  The author operates from the viewpoint that Islamist terrorists 
have “perverted a major religion into a hateful worldview,” a sentiment that is expressed 
multiple times throughout the paper.15  While the paper, released by the Homeland Security 
Committee, does address the ideological foundation that unites militant Islamist groups, it 
fails to provide a thorough ideological approach to solving the issue at hand.  As part of the 
author’s suggested strategy, he includes the self-evident requirement of “developing a 
counter-messaging program specifically targeting Islamist terrorism.”16  The only detail he 
contributes to this counter-messaging program is that it must focus on empowering credible 
voices.  These supposedly credible voices include: former extremists, family members 
affected by terror, and moderate religious figures.  McCaul fails to address by what standard 
he assesses these people to be “credible” and subsequently proposes a list of individuals 
whose potential to dissuade jihadis or budding jihadis is questionable.   The paper would 
have benefited from an explanation on how, according to the author’s reasoning, a family 
member who has lost a loved one due to an act of terror could dissuade jihadis or budding 
jihadis from committing further acts of terror.   
Alex P. Schmid’s research paper, Challenging the Narrative of the “Islamic State,” 
was published by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.  The author examines 
multiple IS themes from various angles, to include theological and historical, in order to 
identify potential vulnerabilities in the group’s ideology with the goal of developing 
convincing counter-arguments.  Schmid astutely states that military force alone is not enough 
                                                          
14 Michael. McCaul. “A National Strategy to Win the War Against Islamist Terror.” House Homeland Security 
Committee. (2016), p. 5 
 
15 Ibid., p. 5 
 
16 Ibid., p. 15  
10 
to break the momentum of IS; a “counter-narrative that can seriously challenge and 
undermine the narrative of IS” is also needed.17  Within his paper, Schmid presents twelve 
claims propagated by IS and follows each with argumentative elements for possible 
incorporation into a counter-message.  He correctly recognizes that “a multiplicity of Muslim 
interpretations exists on the Quran, on Muhammad’s exemplary way of life and on Islamic 
law”18 and that for “almost every example [of violence] one can find a counter-example and, 
in some cases, even a counter-counter-example.”19  Taking Schmid’s words to their logical 
conclusion, these statements concede that examples indeed exist in the Quran to support at 
least some of IS’s themes.  Schmid ultimately proposes counter/alternative narratives that 
attempt to use self-interest (ie. keep your life) and the “inner voice of humanity” in order to 
appeal to “vulnerable/rebellious young Muslims.”20  While such a tactic may work on 
“rebellious young Muslims” it is doubtful to have an impact on those who already accept IS’s 
ideology as divinely sanctioned truth.  A counter-message would have to demonstrate a) that 
IS’s ideology is false and b) it is in one’s interest to believe that which is true and reject that 
which is false. 
In his 2009 paper Terrorist Drop-outs: One Way of Promoting a Counter-Narrative, 
Michael Jacobson attempts to demonstrate that former terrorists are the most effective and 
credible voice for delivering a counter-narrative to terrorists of the Islamic ilk, ie. militant 
Islamists.  He makes many valid points and identifies, what this researcher considers, 
                                                          
17 Alex P. Schmid, “Challenging the Narrative of the “Islamic State”” International Centre for Counter-
Terrorism – The Hague. (2015), p 2 
 
18 Ibid., p. 4 
 
19 Ibid., p. 6 
 
20 Ibid., p. 14 
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prerequisites for a successful psychological operations approach.  First, Jacobson recognizes 
the importance of the “battle of ideas” in winning the war against militant Islamism.21  He 
understands that whatever ideas are presented to militant Islamists, they must have a stronger 
appeal than the ideas that the militants already accept.  The author suggests that an effective 
counter-narrative must appeal to “not only those vulnerable to the extremist message, but 
also those on the path toward radicalization, and those already radicalized.”22  A final point 
made by Jacobson, with which this researcher strongly agrees, is that the U.S. government is 
not always the most effective messenger for a counter-narrative.23  In regards to the specifics 
of his proposed counter-narrative, Jacobson misses the mark.  He suggests a “naming and 
shaming” approach to undermine and generate a lack of respect for a terrorist group’s 
leadership.24  As an example, Jacobson references a video released by the U.S. government in 
2006 showing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s ineptness in handling a certain firearm.  While this 
approach may affect how a militant Islamist views a particular leader, it does not affect the 
ideas that he holds which makes him a militant Islamist in the first place.  An effective 
psychological operation should change a militant’s mind about his militancy, not about his 
leaders.  Jacobson suggests an additional approach which involves “demonstrating civilian 
and Muslim suffering at the hands of terrorist.”25  The problem with this suggestion is that 
groups like al-Qaeda and IS consider civilian populations valid targets and justify killing 
                                                          
21 Michael Jacobson, “Terrorist Drop-outs: One Way of Promoting a Counter-Narrative.” Perspectives on 
Terrorism, Volume, 3, Number 2 (25 November 2010)  
 
22 Ibid., p. 12 
 
23 Ibid, p. 15 
 
24 Ibid., p. 13 
 
25 Ibid., p. 13 
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professing Muslims by deeming them as apostates deserving of death.  These militant 
Islamist particulars will be discussed in a later chapter.  Fear is another factor that Jacobson 
thinks should be part of a counter-narrative.26  Once again, while fear may influence a person 
to act or not act in a certain way at a given time, it is unlikely to challenge the beliefs and 
ideas that actually make a Muslim a militant Islamist.  Despite the unconvincing nature of 
Jacobson’s counter-narrative details, several of his counter-narrative prerequisites will be 
included in the PSYOP approach proposed in this paper. 
Dr. Coyt Hargus authored an admirable paper titled Islamic Radicalization and the 
Global Islamist Movement: Protecting U.S. National Interests by Understanding and 
Countering Islamist Grand Strategy With U.S. Policy which he subsequently published 
through the Joint Advanced Warfighting School.  In his paper Dr. Hargus examines the 
“Global Islamist Movement’s historic and theological foundations, its ideology, and its 
published strategy in order to argue the enduring nature of the movement’s threat to U.S. 
interests globally.”27  Dr. Hargus goes against the grain of the accepted narrative that claims 
militant Islamists are so removed from proper Islamic doctrine as to be considered non-
Islamic and he instead concludes that their “core values are centered on the Quran, its 
accompanying exegesis documents, and the established corpus of laws known collectively as 
Sharia.”28  The author does an excellent job of relating national security strategy with 
objective perspectives on religious interpretation.  While Dr. Hargus explains the various 
                                                          
26 Jacobson, p. 15 
 
27 Coyt Hargus.  “Islamic Radicalization and the Global Isalmist Movement: Protecting U.S. National Interests 
by Understanding and Countering Islamist Grand Strategy With U.S. Policy.” National Defense University, 
Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School. (2013), p. ii 
 
28 Ibid., p. 33 
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authoritative sources, to include the authoritative exegetes (mufassireen), he opts not to 
provide their actual exegesis of relevant Quranic passages as part of his thesis paper.  The 
reader is forced to therefore draw his own conclusions regarding the meaning of Quranic 
passages provided by Dr. Hargus.  This leaves too much room for subjectivity and therefore 
any conclusions reached by the reader would be viewed as unqualified, unauthoritative and 
ultimately irrelevant.    Analysis of foundational Islamic texts, buttressed by authoritative 
commentaries (tafsir) from Islamic scholars renowned and respected throughout history, 
would have greatly improved Dr. Hargus’ already impressive work.  In Chapter VI of this 
paper, I explain why tafsir is considered authoritative and demonstrate that, despite being 
separated by centuries and even espousing certain theological differences (Sunni vs Shia), 
there is much consensus among the mufasireen (authors of tafsir) in their commentaries.   
In Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy, Michael W.S. Ryan links militant Islamist strategy 
with that of Maoist guerrilla warfare.  He argues that groups like Al-Qaeda have little in 
common with mainstream Islam.  Among scholars there are no doubts regarding the validity 
of this argument.  Militant Islamist groups themselves proudly claim to have little in common 
with mainstream Islam, which they view as heretical and, in the spirit of takfir, downright 
apostasy.  Despite the claims on the publisher’s page that Ryan’s research shows that the 
strategy of groups like al-Qaeda is a “largely secular departure from the classic Muslim 
conception of jihad,”29 Ryan himself writes that jihadists use “an equally valid interpretation 
of the word jihad”30 and that in Muhammad’s own understanding of jihad “the violent 
                                                          
29 Columbia University Press. “Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy.” <https://cup.columbia.edu/book/decoding-
alqaedas-strategy/9780231163842> 
 
30 Michael W. S. Ryan. Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. Columbia University 
Press, 2013 p. 24 
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meaning crowds out other meanings.”31  This book supports the thesis of this research paper 
as it pertains to the war of ideas and the inability of bullets and bombs to completely solve 
the problem of militant Islamism.  Ryan, discussing the deep battle of ideas, claims “though 
American bullets cut down Osama bin Laden, global jihad is a powerful idea with a life of its 
own, one that bullets cannot touch.”32 
Similar to Ryan’s book, Paul Berman links militant Islamism to more contemporary 
totalitarian ideologies in his book Terror and Liberalism.  Berman suggests that radical 
Islamism is purely a reaction against Western liberalism rather than being rooted in 
fundamental Islamic ideology.  He provides thorough analysis of a leading contemporary 
Islamist philosopher, Sayyid Qutb, though he fails to appeal to authoritative Islamic texts to 
support his dismissal of militant Islamism’s connection with the overarching religious 
ideology of Islam.  In this thesis paper numerous tafsir (authoritative exegesis) will be cited 









                                                          
31 Ryan, p. 25 
 




THE UTILITY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
 
 At this point it is appropriate to consider the utility of psychological operations 
(PSYOP), and whether or not PSYOP are an effective tool in supporting national security by 
persuading one’s adversary.  In December 2010, under the direction of then Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates, the term “psychological operations” was replaced with “military 
information support operations” (MISO) in order to “more accurately reflect and convey the 
nature” of such operations.33  As a result, the 2010 Joint Publication 3-13.2 was republished 
almost two years after its original release.  In the revised version the term “psychological 
operations” was replaced throughout the publication with “military information support 
operations” except when referencing past doctrine.  It is the personal preference of this 
author to continue to use the term psychological operations in defining “planned operations 
to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their 
emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals” (the definition of PSYOP in 2010 and currently the 
definition of MISO).34    
PSYOP are a core capability of information operations (IO).  Within the framework 
of IO, PSYOP are considered an information related capability (IRC) and can be employed in 
                                                          
33 “Joint Publication 3-13.2: Military Information Support Operations.” United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jan 
2010 (Incorporating Change 1 from Dec 2011)., p. iii 
 
34 “Joint Publication 3-13.2: Psychological Operations United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jan 2010 p. GL-8 
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concert with other IRCs such as electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations 
(CNO), military deception (MILDEC) and operations security (OPSEC) to “influence, 
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting 
our own.”35   One possible way of accomplishing this is through the conveyance of selected 
information to the target audience designed to effect the target’s emotions, reasoning 
abilities, and presuppositions. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command Public Affairs 
Office explains that psychological operations “rely on logic, fear, desire, or other mental 
factors to persuade and promote specific emotions, attitudes or behaviors.”36  The ultimate 
desired outcome is a change in the target’s behavior favorable to the United States’ national 
security objectives. 
 History demonstrates that there is precedence in the Western world for employing 
psychological operations to counter an anti-western ideology.  In 1948, British Foreign 
Secretary Earnest Bevin along with other individuals like Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Foreign 
Office Under Secretary responsible for information activities, proposed a plan to reinforce 
Western civilization against encroaching Soviet communist propaganda.  The plan included 
going on the ideological offensive, which meant attacking and exposing the Soviet 
communist ideology and presenting “something far better.”37  The Soviet ideologs at the time 
promoted a system of values and universal principles which they intended to spread as part of 
                                                          
35 “Joint Publication 3-13.2: Psychological Operations United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jan 2010 p. ix 
 
36 “Military Information Support Operations Command (Airborne) (Provisional) Fact Sheet” U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command, p. 1 Retrieved from http://www.soc.mil/MISOC/MISO%20fact%20sheet.pdf 
 
37 Andrew Defty, “British anti-communist propaganda and cooperation with the United States, 1945-1951.” 
University of Salford, 2002, p. 77 
 
17 
some great historical, revolutionary enterprise.38  The West’s PSYOP strategy was to 
promote a counter-ideology, based on Democratic principles, intended to “expose the Soviet 
workers’ paradise as a gigantic hoax.”39  There was initially concern that the staunch anti-
Soviet aspect of the West’s proposed PSYOP campaign might offend some Western 
socialists who, while politically communist, shared a Western-influenced worldview. 40  
However, it was ultimately concluded that in order to be effective the PSYOP campaign must 
thoroughly criticize the communist ideology and Soviet policy.  
 The communist ideology drove the aggressive, subversive, and expansionist policies 
of the Soviet state.  A change in ideology, it was thought, would lead to a change in policy 
and a reduction of tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R..  Therefore the U.S. invested 
heavily in ideological warfare with the goal of bankrupting the Soviet worldview.  The 
combined U.S. and British PSYOP initiative in the 1950’s was an ideological offensive 
which utilized information as a “propaganda weapon designed to win the cold war.”41  The 
so-called Campaign for Truth was founded on the presupposition that Soviet communism 
was “a wicked system.”42  Soviet intentions were clearly identified as being “inescapably 
militant” because they were fueled by a world-wide revolutionary ideology.43  As some in the 
intelligence community at that time reasoned, there were only three alternatives in the cold 
                                                          
38 Katharine C. Gorka and Patrick Sookhdeo, “Fighting the Ideological War: Winning Strategies from 
Communism to Islamism.” McLean: Isaac Publishing, 2012 
 
39 Defty, p. 78 
 
40 Ibid., p. 78 
 
41 Ibid., p. 165 
 
42 Ibid., p. 211 
 
43 Philip M Taylor,. “‘Munitions of the Mind’: A Brief History of Military Psychological Operations.” Place 
Branding and Public Diplomacy. 3. 2007 p. 257 
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war: surrender, World War III, or fighting world Communism to a standstill by means of 
psychological warfare.44  A PSYOP campaign was designed to persuade the public, both 
behind the Iron Curtain and beyond, regarding the true nature of the Soviet ideology by 
concentrating “wholly on the negative, anti-Communist, anti-Soviet aspect” as well as 
highlighting its shortcomings as a viable worldview.45  The results of this campaign are 
recorded in history books.  While the collapse of the Soviet State was due in large part to its 
failure as a political and economic system, PSYOP nonetheless “lowered morale in the 
Communist ranks, induced defections, [and] increased people’s readiness to assist the 
West.”46  Suffice it to say, the ideology of the Soviet Union lost the ideological war against 
Western democratic principles. 
As demonstrated, a PSYOP campaign was waged relentlessly against an adversary 
who was viewed at the time as the United States’ ideological antithesis.  In the face of 
another adversarial, revolutionary, militant ideology, the United States must once again go on 
the ideological offensive to expose another “gigantic hoax.”  Despite differing from Soviet 
Communists in their lines of rationale along which they operate, at their core militant 
Islamists nonetheless hold certain things to be true for which they are willing to fight.  By 
exposing these core truths to be false, or at least very probably false, a successful PSYOP 
campaign does not necessarily have to persuade militant Islamists to completely abandon 
their worldview, but simply make it less likely that they would be morally prepared to die for 
it.  While history is replete with examples of people dying for something they believed in, 
                                                          
44 John Brockmiller. “Psywar In Intelligence Operations.” Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 3 (Summer1961), 
Retrieved from  https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol5no3/html/v05i3a04p_0001.htm 
 
45 Defty, p. 213 
 
46 Brockmiller, para. 9 
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much fewer are the examples of people dying for something they knew to be, or at least 























CHAPTER V  
 
PHASE 1 – WHAT MILITANT ISLAMISTS CLAIM TO BELIEVE 
 
For phase 1 of the research, the researcher reviewed the literature published by 
militant Islamists themselves, identifying and compiling into an outline their professed 
beliefs, strategies and goals.  As this phase was not meant to produce a systematic theological 
breakdown of all beliefs held by militant Islamist groups, the outline of beliefs is not 
exhaustive.  It focuses on those beliefs that directly impact or could potentially impact U.S. 
national security objectives.  As an example, beliefs dealing with dietary restrictions, 
cleansing rituals, explanations of the natural world, and other similar beliefs are omitted from 
this section. 
A common theme throughout militant Islamist literature is that various systems 
outside of Islam, whether they are political, social, economic or religious, are equated to 
pagan idolatry.  This includes Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, Judaism, Buddhism, 
Hinduism, nationalism, democracy, capitalism, communism and fascism.47  These systems, 
ideologies, and beliefs are all considered to be kufr, meaning disbelief.  Leading the “camp of 
the Jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of 
kufr” are America and Russia.48  The rationale behind this opposition to all other ideologies, 
                                                          
47 Islamic State. “The Return of the Khilafah.” Dabiq, V. 1, 5 July 2014 p. 8; Islamic State. “Just Terror” Dabiq 
V 12 18 November 2015 p. 13 & 43 
 
48 Islamic State. “The Return of the Khilafah.” Dabiq, V. 1, 5 July 2014 p. 10 
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regardless of their nature, is that Allah alone is the only one to whom allegiance should be 
pledged – not a national symbol such as a flag and certainly not another divine being.49 
 Militant Islamists claim that since the Messenger of Allah, Muhammad, was harsh 
towards the kafiruna (plural of kafir, ie. unbelievers), Muslims now should also be harsh 
towards unbelievers.50  Intrinsically associated with unbelief is the idea of shirk, the 
deification or worship of anyone or anything besides the single Allah (as opposed to the 
Triune God of Christianity).  Militant Islamists like IS believe that “committing shirk with 
Allah is a sin that makes one permissible to be killed.”51  They hold that the shedding of the 
blood of mushrikun (those who comment shirk) is necessary and a blessed deed.52  
Mushrikun are to be struck down either until they enter into Islam or enter into dhimmah 
(protection) by paying the jizyah (religious tax) in humiliation.53  Militant Islamists hold that 
for any kafir or mushrik “who is neither a dhimmi nor one who’s been granted security, 
regardless of whether he is a combatant or non-combatant, or whether he defames Islam or 
does not, or whether he transgresses against the blood, wealth, and honor of the Muslims or 
does not […] Allah has commanded [Muslims] to fight.”54  Those who do not adopt the 
                                                          
49 Islamic State. “Just Terror” Dabiq V 12 18 November 2015 p. 34 
 
50 Islamic State. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone.” Dabiq V 7 12 February 2015 
p. 32 
 
51 Islamic State. “The Ruling of the Belligerent Christians.” Rumiyah V 9 4 May 2017 p. 5 
 
52 Ibid, p. 5 
 
53 Islamic State. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone.” Dabiq V 7 12 February 2015 
pg 24; Islamic State. “The Ruling of the Belligerent Christians.” Rumiyah V 9 4 May 2017, p. 5 
 
54 Ibid., p. 6-7 
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religion of truth (ie. Islam) or refuse to subject themselves to its requirements are to be 
fought against; their necks are to be struck until slaughter has been inflicted upon them.55   
The 15th volume of the Islamic State’s magazine Dabiq includes an article titled 
“Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You” in which IS presents in “unequivocal terms” 
why it hates and fights against the West.  Leading the list of reasons is unbelief (absence of a 
belief) and disbelief (the rejection or abandonment of a belief).  Rejecting Allah as god and 
refusing to worship him is the primary reason why IS hates an entire group of people.  IS 
writes “just as your disbelief is the primary reason we hate you, your disbelief is the primary 
reason we fight you, as we have been commanded to fight the disbelievers until they submit 
to the authority of Islam.”56  This leads IS to conclude that even if the western nations were 
to cease their kinetic warfare against them, IS would nonetheless continue campaigns of 
terror until “there is no fitnah (paganism) and until religion, all of it, is for Allah.”57  The 
second reason given for the hatred and violence towards the West is that our secular societies 
“permit the very things that Allah has prohibited, while banning many of the things he has 
permitted.”58  The third reason, similar to the first, concerns once again the lack of belief, 
however the focus here is specifically on atheists because they “disbelieve in the existence of 
[the] Lord and Creator”59 as opposed to followers of other religions who believe in a Creator, 
but reject the god of Islam. 
                                                          
55 Islamic State. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone.” Dabiq V. 7, 12 February 2015 
p. 21 
 
56 Islamic State. “Break the Cross.” Dabiq V. 15, 31 July 2016, p. 31 
 
57 Ibid., p. 31 15, 31 
 
58 Ibid., p. 31-32 
 
59 Ibid., p. 32 
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Militant Islamists also claim that tacit approval of disbelief is itself disbelief.60  They 
declare that any Muslims in close association with unbelievers are themselves murtaddin 
(apostates).  Militant Islamist groups see it as their obligation to terrorize and kill apostates 
and any “tribe, party, or assembly that would support the crusaders.”61  They invoke the 
concept of jahiliyah (ignorance) when they condemn imams and scholars for calling on 
disbelievers to form an alliance against IS.62  Jahiliyah, in classical usage, is a term denoting 
the period of time before the advent of Islam; in contemporary usage it refers to secular 
modernity in the present-day Muslim world.63  The Islamic State compares modern-day  
Muslims to “a hundred camels amongst which you almost can’t find any that are fit for 
riding.”64  In their worldview, Muslims must work together to eradicate anything that inhibits 
complete submission to Allah.  They stand committed to holding onto the purity, clarity and 
comprehensiveness of Islam while fighting those who have turned away or reject it until “the 
religion of Allah [is] triumphant over all other religions.”65  
                                                          
60 Islamic State. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone.” Dabiq V 7 12 February 2015 
p. 60 
 
61 Islamic State. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone.” Dabiq V 7 12 February 2015, 
p. 8; Islamic State. “The Return of the Khilafah.” Dabiq, V. 1, 5 July 2014 p 37 
 
62 Islamic State. “Break the Cross” Dabiq, V. 15, 31 July 2016, p. 27 
 
63 Eleanor Abdella Doumato,. "Jāhilīyah." In The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. , edited by 
John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236MIW/e0406 (accessed 13-Sep-2018). 
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 Finally, groups like IS ridicule the West’s slogan that “Islam is a religion of peace.”66 
They mock the repetition of this statement claiming that the “evidence for [Islam being a 
religion of the sword] is so profuse that only a heretic would argue otherwise.”67  However, 
the leadership of IS and other militant Islamist groups recognizes the utility of this belief to 
their benefit even if they consider it false.  They claim Muslims living in the west are in a 
position to cause great harm to the enemy.68 They encourage followers to use deception to 
“trick one’s target into believing that they are safe before killing them.”69  Deception is cited 
as being the most appropriate method for one seeking to slaughter large numbers of kafiruna. 
 The paragraphs above were meant to provide a brief summary of the beliefs professed 
by militant Islamist groups which directly impact or could potentially impact U.S. national 
security objectives.  By citing the militants’ own literature, and avoiding additional 
commentary about their publications, the author of this paper strove to capture the essence of 
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67 Islamic State. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone.” Dabiq V 7 12 February 2015 
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68 Al-Qaeda. “May Our Souls Be Sacrificed for you.” Inspire. Summer 2010, p. 17 
 
69 Islamic State. “The Ruling of the Belligerent Christians.” Rumiyah V 9 4 May p. 48 
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CHAPTER VI  
 
PHASE 2 – TO THE SOURCES! 
 
(IS THE MILITANT ISLAMIST WORLDVIEW CONSISTENT) 
  
 This phase of the research is the most vital to determining an appropriate 
psychological operations strategy, whether that means continuing with our current approach, 
which will be discussed in a later chapter, or shifting tactics to a different approach.  The 
goal is to demonstrate that militant Islamists such as IS either have a fundamentally flawed 
understanding of the ideology that they profess adherence to or that they are indeed in 
adherence to the fundamentals of their professed ideology.  Whatever the result, it should 
drive any PSYOP strategy aimed at influencing the cognitive domain of the adversary with 
the ultimate goal of causing a change in his behavior favorable to U.S. national security 
objectives.  As previously mentioned, a person or group can claim adherence to a certain 
source of inspiration, though it does not necessarily follow that the group is indeed consistent 
with, or in compliance with, the supposed source of inspiration.  Its claim is verified or 
refuted by going to the source, in this case the Quran.  The Quran is the absolute authority 
and single uniting factor in the complex study of Islam.  From the most austere Salafist to the 
most spiritually minded Sufi, the Quran is the authority for the broad spectrum of beliefs and 
practices known today as Islam.  For all Muslims, the Quran is the eternal word of Allah 
without admixture of man’s insights or thoughts.  Therefore its representations are viewed as 
perfectly accurate and its commands divinely justified.  The Quran calls for all Muslims to 
follow Allah and his word alone: 
26 
[Say] “Shall I seek a judge other than Allah while it is He Who 
has sent down unto you the Book, explained in detail." (Surah 
6:114)70 
 
Follow, [O mankind], what has been revealed to you from your 
Lord and do not follow other than Him any allies. (Surah 7:3) 
 
While the Quran claims to be intrinsically clear and understandable in and of itself,71 
this research will also reference the hadith (sayings or actions attributed to Muhammad) and 
the tafsir (authoritative exegesis) in order to ensure a proper, or at least recognizably 
authoritative, understanding of Quranic text.  Among the ummah (Muslim community), the 
most widely used hadith are known as Al-Kutub Al-Sittah (“The Six Books” or “The 
Authentic Six”).72  These six include: Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Sunan an-Nasa’I, 
Sunan Abu Dawud, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, and Suana Ibn Majah.  The sayings and actions of 
Muhammad are considered of upmost importance because the Quranic teaching on how to be 
a Muslim is normatively exemplified in the life of Muhammad.  Allah has stated in his word: 
“Ye have indeed in the Messenger of Allah a beautiful pattern of conduct.”73 Out of the six 
hadith, Sahih al-Bukhari has the highest standing in the Islamic community followed by the 
                                                          
70 In quoting from the Quran this researcher draws mostly from The Noble Quran, a contemporary translation 
that is officially sponsored by the Saudi government.  It is reported to be the most widely disseminated Quran in 
most Islamic bookstores and Sunni mosques throughout the English-speaking world.  I also use such well-
known and accepted renderings in English as Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s translation, Mohammad Habib Shakir’s 
translation, and the translation known as Sahih International.  The Noble Quran can be found at the following 
site: http://www.noblequran.com/translation.  The other translations can be found here: http://al-
quran.info/#trans 
 
71 Quran. Surah 43:2-3 
 
72 Joseph Butta.  “The Dawn of Islamic Literalism: Rise of the Crescent Moon.” P. Bloomington: Author House 
2013 p. ix 
 
73 Quran. Surah 33:21 
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hadith of his student, Muslim Ibn al-Hajjaj (Sahih Muslim).74  Therefore the research will 
draw upon these two when appropriate. 
The word tafsir is an Arabic word meaning interpretation or exegesis.  It is derived 
from the word fassara which means to explain, to expound, or to disclose.  In Islamic 
contexts, it is defined as understanding and uncovering the will of Allah as is conveyed by 
the Quranic text.75   It has been written of tafsir that it “acts like the key that unlocks the 
treasure [of the Quran], so that mankind can benefit from it to the greatest possible extent.”76   
Tafsir is written by a mufassir, an authoritative expert who must literally master and be 
qualified in 15 fields before he can authoritatively interpret or explain the Quran.77  These 
fields include classical Arabic, Arabic philology, Arabic morphology, the science of 
etymology, syntax, metaphors, the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, and several others.  In 
order to provide an authoritative verdict concerning practices of Islam as prescribed by the 
Quran one must be “knowledgeable of the Book of Allah, and [be able to differentiate 
between] its naasikh (things abrogated by Allah) from its mansookh (new rulings) and its 
muhkam (clear verses) from its mutashaabih (allegorical verses) and its makkee (Meccan) 
from its madanee (Madinan) and its asbaab an-nuzool (circumstances of revelation).”78  
Suffice it to say, it is not permissible for your average layman like one’s neighbor, co-
                                                          
74 Ibn Al-Salah Shahrazuri. “An Introduction to the Science of Hadith.” 1st ed., Garnet Publishing, 2005, p. 1245 
 
75 Abu Ammaar Yasir Qadhi. “An Introduction to the Sciences of the Qur’aan.” Birmingham: Al-Hidaayah 
Publishing and Distribution. 1999 p. 289 
 
76 Ibid., p. 292 
 
77 Ibid., p. 324 
 
78 Abu Ammaar Yasir Qadhi. “An Introduction to the Sciences of the Qur’aan.” Birmingham: Al-Hidaayah 
Publishing and Distribution. 1999 p. 324 
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worker, or even professor to interpret the Quran in a manner inconsistent with the 
mufassireen (plural of mufassir).  
 The rigid science of tafsir is a process that is long-established, formal, and fixed; the 
qualifications required for deriving meaning for the Quran are not negotiable.79  This 
research will focus on three notable mufassireen and their respective tafsir.  The readers 
should bear in mind that the tafsir presented are those for which the author of this paper was 
able to find an English translation.  However, it is equally as important to consider that these 
particular tafsir were translated into English due to their popularity and recognized 
scholarship.  Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim was written by the highly influential Sunni scholar 
Ismail Ibn Kathir who was known for having memorized the entire Quran word-for-word.  
The tafsir of Ibn Kathir was written around 1370 AD and is one of the most respected and 
accepted explanations for the Quran and is the most widely used explanation in Arabic 
today.80  He is also considered to be Islam’s preeminent historian and scholar by Middle 
 
Figure 1: Comments on Ibn Kathir’s Scholarship  
 
 
                                                          
79 Coyt Hargus. “Quranic Interpretation: True Messages vs Manipulations.” FAO Journal International Affairs  
Volume XIV, Number 2 May 2011, p. 20 
 
80 “Quran Tafsir” Retrieved from http://www.qtafsir.com/ 
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East Foreign Area Officer and former special advisor on Islamic militancy at the Office of 
the Secretary of  Defense for International Security Affairs, Commander Youssef Aboul-
Enein.81  The other two tafsir are the two most contemporary tafsir, written by recognized 
mufasireen, for which this researcher was able to find translations in English.  Ma’ariful 
Quran is another Sunni tafsir completed around 1976 by the Islamic Scholar Mufti 
Muhammad Shafi.  Neither Ibn Kathir nor Muhammad Shafi was of the Hanbali school of 
jurisprudence, the school of thought typically associated with militant Islamists.  Ibn Kathir 
was of the Shafi’i tradition and Muhammad Shafi was a Hanafi jurist.82  The Shia Tafsir al-
Mizan (1981), which was written by the Islamic philosopher Allamah Sayyid Muhammad 
Husayn Tabataba'i, is a 20 volume tafsir.  Unfortunately, not all of the volumes have been 
translated into English.   Despite the gap in time between the Ibn Kathir’s tafsir and the other 
two contemporary tafsir and their theological differences (Sunni vs. Shia), the reader will 
notice significant unity in the general interpretation and explanation of these mufassireen.    
 What follows are verses, in no particular order, often cited by militant Islamist groups 
to support their belief system outlined in Phase 1.  Militant Islamists are often chided for 
misunderstanding or misapplying these same verses.  Therefore each verse will be followed 
by excerpts from the hadith and/or tafsir mentioned above in order to avoid the charge of 
using isolated, out-of-context quotations in order to establish or refute a proposition.  The 
words of Muhammad and explanation of the mufassireen will provide the context.  Again, 
                                                          
81 Youssef Aboul-Enein, “Islamic Rulings on Warfare” Strategic Studies Institute, Oct 2004, p. 7 Retrieved 
from https://fas.org/man/eprint/islamic.pdf 
 
82 Naghma. “Impact of the Ahl-E-Hadith  Movement on Contemporary Muslim Society in India.” Department 
of Islamic Studies, Aligarh Muslim University. Aligarh, 2015 India Retrieved from 
https://ia800103.us.archive.org/19/items/ImpactOfTheAhlAlHadithMovementOnContemporaryMuslimSocietyI
nIndia/Impact%20of%20the%20Ahl%20al-
%20Hadith%20movement%20on%20Contemporary%20Muslim%20Society%20in%20India.pdf  p. 66 
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the reader should bear in mind that this section does not serve to determine whether or not 
groups like IS are right or wrong in their beliefs, but instead serves solely to determine 
whether or not these groups can find legitimate justification for their beliefs and behavior in 
the Islamic texts, which would subsequently give them a divine mandate to oppose 
contemporary manifestations of Islam and to conduct warfare against unbelievers and 
perceived heretics.  This determination will be made by surveying the beliefs of those 
deemed qualified by the ummah to explain the proper understanding of the texts.  Words or 
whole sentences will be underlined when they either directly confirm or refute a belief held 
by militant Islamists.  Each section will conclude with an analysis of the text as it relates to 
the professed beliefs and concomitant behavior of militant Islamists.   
Quran 
Say to those who have disbelieved, if they cease (from 
disbelief) their past will be forgiven. But if they return 
(thereto), then the examples of those (punished) before them 
have already preceded (as a warning). And fight them until 
there is no more fitnah (disbelief and polytheism: i.e. 
worshipping others besides Allah) and the religion (worship) 
will all be for Allah alone [in the whole of the world]. But if 
they cease (worshipping others besides Allah), then certainly, 
Allah is All-Seer of what they do. (Surah 8:38-39) 
 
Fight against those who (1) believe not in Allah, (2) nor in the 
Last Day, (3) nor forbid that which has been forbidden by 
Allah and His Messenger (4) and those who acknowledge not 
the religion of truth (i.e. Islam) among the people of the 
Scripture (Jews and Christians), until they pay the jizyah 
(religious tax) with willing submission, and feel themselves 
subdued.  (Surah 9:29) 
 
O you who believe! Fight those of the disbelievers who are 
close to you, and let them find harshness in you, and know that 




Hadith (sayings/actions of Muhammad) 
 
Allah's Apostle said, “I have been ordered to fight the people 
till they say: ‘None has the right to be worshipped but Allah,’ 
and whoever says, ‘None has the right to be worshipped but 
Allah’ his life and property will be saved from me.”83 
 
I have been ordered (by Allah) to fight against the people until 
they testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah 
and that Muhammad is Allah’s Apostle.84 
 
I have been commanded to fight against people so long as they 
do not declare that there is no god but Allah.85 
 
Exegesis (authoritative explanations)  
 
Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim  
Commenting on Surah 8:39 
 “There is a Hadith collected in the Two Sahihs that testifies to 
this explanation [of eliminating unbelief]. The Messenger of 
Allah said, ‘I was commanded to fight against the people until 
they proclaim, ‘There is no deity worthy of worship except 
Allah.’ If and when they say it, they will preserve their blood 
and wealth from me.’” 86   
 
Commenting on Surah 9:29  
“Allah commands His believing servants, who are pure in 
religion and person, to expel the idolaters who are filthy in the 
religious sense.  This honorable Ayah (verse) was revealed with 
the order to fight the People of the Book. After the pagans were 
defeated, the people entered Allah's religion in large numbers, 
                                                          
83 Sahih Bukhari 2946  Book 52, Hadith 158 https://sunnah.com/bukhari/56/158; Sahih Bukhari 6924 Book 88, 
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and the Arabian Peninsula was secured under the Muslims' 
control. Allah commanded His Messenger to fight the People 
of the Scriptures, Jews and Christians, on the ninth year of 
Hijrah, and he prepared his army to fight the Romans and 
called the people to Jihad announcing his intent and 
destination.  ‘[Fight] (until they pay the Jizyah)’, if they do not 
choose to embrace Islam, (with willing submission), in defeat 
and subservience, (and feel themselves subdued.), disgraced, 
humiliated and belittled.  The Prophet said, ‘Do not initiate the 
Salam (peaceful greeting) to the Jews and Christians, and if 
you meet any of them in a road, force them to its narrowest 
alley.’”87 
 
Commenting on Surah 9:123 
“Allah commands the believers to fight the disbelievers, the 
closest in area to the Islamic state, then the farthest.  This is 
why the Messenger of Allah started fighting the idolaters in the 
Arabian Peninsula. When he finished with them and Allah gave 
him control over Makkah (Mecca) and other Arab provinces, 
and the various Arab tribes entered Islam in large crowds, he 
then started fighting the People of the Scriptures (Jews and 
Christians)…Let the disbelievers find harshness in you against 
them in battle. The complete believer is he who is kind to his 
believing brother, and harsh with his disbelieving enemy.”88 
 
Ma'ariful Quran 
Commenting on Surah 8:38-39 
“Two words: Fitnah and Din, used here need our attention 
since both are used in many shades of meaning lexically. At 
this place, two meanings have been reported from authorities of 
Tafsir from among the Sahabah and Tabi'in: (1) That Fitnah is 
taken to mean Kufr (disbelief) and Shirk (idolatry) and Din is 
taken to mean the Din (religion) of Islam.  Given this exegetic 
view, the verse would mean that Muslims must continue 
fighting disbelievers until disbelief disintegrates yielding its 
place to Islam and there remains no religion and faith other 
                                                          
87 Ibn Kathir. Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim 
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88 Ibn Kathir. Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim 
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than Islam. Given this situation, this injunction will be specific 
to only the people of Makkah (Mecca) and the people of Arabia 
- because, the Arabian Peninsula is the home of Islam. The 
presence of any other religion, other than Islam in it, shall be 
dangerous for Islam. As for the rest of the world, other 
religions and faiths could be kept existing as confirmed by 
other verses of the Holy Qur'an and reports from Hadith.89…In 
other parts of the world, the disbelievers may opt for jizyah and 
may continue to profess their own religion, the punishment of 
their disbelief being deferred to the Hereafter.”90      
         
Commenting on Surah 9:29 
“As for the injunction of jihad against the People of the Book 
given in verse 29, it is really not particular to the People of the 
Book. The fact is that this very injunction applies to all 
disbelieving groups - because, the reasons for the injunction to 
fight mentioned next are common to all disbelievers.  If so, the 
injunction has to be common too.  But, the People of the Book 
were mentioned here particularly to serve a purpose.  Since, it 
was possible that Muslims may hesitate to fight against them 
on the ground that they too are believers in a certain degree, 
believers in Torah and Injil (Gospel), and in Sayyidna Musa 
(Moses) and 'Isa (Jesus) (may peace be upon them both).  So, it 
was possible that their connection with past prophets and their 
Books may become a factor in dissuading them from jihad. 
Therefore, fighting with them was mentioned particularly…. 
Literally, jizyah means return or recompense.  In the 
terminology of the Shari'ah, it refers to the amount of money 
taken from disbelievers in lieu of killing.  The reason is that 
kufr (disbelief/unbelief) and shirk (sin of practicing idolatry or 
polytheism) are rebellion against Allah and Rasul (the 
Messenger/Apostle). Killing is the real punishment for it. But, 
Allah Ta'ala (Almight) has, in His perfect mercy, reduced their 
punishment by giving them an option. [ie. pay the jizyah]”91 
 
                                                          
89 Muhammad Shafi. Ma'ariful Quran, Vol 4, p. 216  https://archive.org/download/maarifulquran-english-
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90 Ibid, p. 219 (footnote) 
 
91 Shafi, Vol 4 p. 363  https://archive.org/download/maarifulquran-english-pdf/MaarifulquranEnglishPdf-Vol4-
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Commenting on Surah 9:123 
“‘Being near’ could be taken in terms of the place, that is, the 
disbelievers who live closer to home base should be fought 
against first.  And it could also be understood in terms of 
relationship, that is, those who are near in kinship, parentage 
and other social bonds should be given precedence.  ‘And let 
them find severity in you’, the word ‘ghilzah’ means severity 
or toughness. The sense is that the disbelievers must be 
confronted in a manner that would not allow them to take their 




 While it may seem possible to derive alternative meanings from the Quranic verses 
above by requiring them to be viewed in a limited and specific historical context, the 
explanations of the mufassireen preclude this approach.  Both of the renowned mufassireen 
explained these Quranic injunctions in the present tense suggesting that the commands are 
continuous, open-ended commands not limited to any historical context.  Despite the 
centuries that had passed since the Quranic verses were first revealed, nowhere in their 
explanations did either of the mufassireen allude to the inapplicability of the commands 
found in these verses during the time period each respective tafsir was written.   
 The argument exists in contemporary Islamic apologetics that “fight” refers solely to 
a spiritual struggle or is exclusively defensive in nature.  This author does not reject the idea 
that these aspects are certainly within the framework of jihad.  But to deny that there is also a 
very aggressive, physical, and brutal aspect would be to oppose the explanation of those 
qualified to provide  proper context and meaning of the Quranic text.  Any rival explanation 
that does not come from a qualified mufassireen would simply be an opinion.  Even if it were 
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a scholarly opinion, it would not be authoritative exegesis.  This thesis does not seek to prove 
that militant Islamists are exclusively right in their interpretation.  The argument of this thesis 
depends on whether or not a militant Islamist understanding of the Quran, by which they 
justify attacks on non-belligerents, is just as valid and supported by the text as any moderate 
understanding of Islam. 
The militant Islamist claim that disbelief is itself a reason to fight and kill appears to 
be consistent with Islamic teachings as evidenced by the Quran and further supported by the 
authentic hadith and respected tafsir.  It is irrelevant if other interpretations exist; the militant 
interpretation finds legitimate support.  If Muhammad is the model of conduct to be 
followed, his words alone as quoted from the hadith serve as justification for groups like IS 
to fight against, or at least demand jizyah from, anyone who does not testify that Allah alone 
has the right to be worshipped.  The reason given for fighting in the above-cited passages is 
not based on defense or in response to persecution; it is based on disbelief in Allah and 
rejection of his supposed words.  As a researcher, it would be analytically dishonest to 
conclude, at least in this regard, that IS and like-minded groups completely bastardize their 
religious texts in order to arrive at an interpretation that justifies their violent behavior.  As it 
concerns fighting against disbelievers simply because of their disbelief, the plain reading of 
the Quranic text appears to support this interpretation.  The writings of Ibn Kathir and 
Muhammad Shafi, two Islamic scholars recognized as being qualified to provide an 
authoritative explanation of the text, further legitimize a violent understanding of the text.  
Their exegesis of the Quranic text combined with their recognized standing of mufassireen 
within the ummah should deflect any criticism of an emotional or intellectual predisposition 
to a particular judgement in this analysis.  If such criticism still exists, it would serve to only 
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reveal the emotional or intellectual bias of the critic or perhaps simply a strong commitment 
to presuppositions that conflict with the militant Islamist worldview. 
Quran 
1. Freedom from (all) obligations (is declared) from Allah and 
His Messenger to those of the Mushrikun93 (polytheists, 
pagans, idolaters, disbelievers in the Oneness of Allah), with 
whom you made a treaty.  2. So travel freely (O Mushrikun) for 
four months (as you will) throughout the land, but know that 
you cannot escape (from the Punishment of) Allah, and Allah 
will disgrace the disbelievers.  3. And a declaration from Allah 
and His Messenger to mankind on the greatest day (the 10th of 
Dhul-Hijjah - the 12th month of Islamic calendar) that Allah is 
free from (all) obligations to the Mushrikun and so is His 
Messenger. So if you (Mushrikun) repent, it is better for you, 
but if you turn away, then know that you cannot escape (from 
the Punishment of) Allah. And give tidings (O Muhammad ) of 
a painful torment to those who disbelieve.  4. Except those of 
the Mushrikun with whom you have a treaty, and who have not 
subsequently failed you in aught, nor have supported anyone 
against you. So fulfill their treaty to them to the end of their 
term. Surely Allah loves Al-Mattaqun (the pious).  5. Then 
when the Sacred Months have passed, kill the Mushrikun 
wherever you find them, and capture them and besiege them, 
and prepare for them each and every ambush. But if they repent 
and perform As-Salat (prayers), and give Zakat (tithe), then 
leave their way free. Verily, Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most 
Merciful.  6. And if anyone of the Mushrikun seeks your 
protection then grant him protection, (so that he may hear the 
Word of Allah), and then escort him to where he can be secure, 
that is because they are men who know not.  7. How can there 
be a covenant with Allah and with His Messenger for the 
Mushrikun except those with whom you made a covenant near 
Al-Masjid-al-Haram (at Mecca)? So long, as they are true to 
you, stand you true to them. Verily, Allah loves Al-Muttaqun 
(the pious). (Surah 9:1-7) 
Hadith  (sayings/actions of Muhammad) 
Allah’s Apostle said, “The Hour (the end of days) will not be 
established until you fight with the Jews, and the stone behind 
                                                          
93 As a reminder, mushrikun are those who commit shirk, which is the deification or worship of anyone or 
anything besides Allah.  Practitioners of all other religions besides Islam are considered mushrikun. 
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which a Jew will be hiding will say. ‘O Muslim! There is a Jew 
hiding behind me, so kill him.’”94 
 
Abu Huraira reported Allah’s Messenger as saying: “The last 
hour would not come unless the Muslims will fight against the 
Jews and the Muslims would kill them until the Jews would 
hide themselves behind a stone or a tree and a stone or a tree 
would say: ‘Muslim, or the servant of Allah, there is a Jew 
behind me; come and kill him’”95 
 
It has been narrated by Umar b. al-Khattib that he heard the 
Messenger of Allah say: “I will expel the Jews and Christians 
from the Arabian Peninsula and will not leave any but 
Muslim.”96 
 
Exegesis (authoritative explanations)  
 
Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim  
Commenting on the entire chapter (Surah 9) 
This honorable Surah was one of the last Surahs97 to be 
revealed to the Messenger of Allah.98 
 
Commenting on verses 4 and 5 
This is an exception regulating the longest extent of time for 
those who have a general treaty - without time mentioned - to 
four months.  They (mushrikun – followers of other religions) 
would have four months to travel the lands in search of 
                                                          
94 Sahih Bukhari 2926, Book 56, Hadith 139  https://sunnah.com/bukhari/56/139 
 
95 Sahih Muslim 2922, Book 54 Hadith 105  https://sunnah.com/muslim/54/105 
 
96 Sahih Muslim 1767 a, Book 32 Hadith 75 https://sunnah.com/muslim/32/75 
 
97 According to the Quran, when Muslims are faced with conflicting commands they are not supposed to simply 
choose the one they like best or follow the one that better reflects cultural norms of modern society.  Rather, 
they are to go to history (with the help of the Hadith) and see which verse was revealed last (the Quran is not 
organized chronologically). Whichever verse came later is said to abrogate (or cancel) the earlier conflicting 
revelation.  This doctrine is supported by Surah 2:106 and Surah 16:101 as well as the explanations of a 
multitude of mufassireen.  Surah 9 is chronologically the second to last surah in the Quran and the last surah 
that contains commands from Allah.  It represents Allah’s final marching orders to his followers. 
 




sanctuary for themselves wherever they wish. Those whose 
treaty mentioned a specific limited term, then the longest it 
would extend was to the point of its agreed upon termination 
date. “Upon the end of the four months during which We 
prohibited you from fighting the idolaters, and which is the 
grace period We gave them,” then fight and kill the idolaters 
wherever you may find them. “Then fight the Mushrikin 
(idolaters) wherever you find them,” means, on the earth in 
general, except for the Sacred Area [Mecca]. Do not wait until 
you find them.  Rather, seek and besiege them in their areas 
and forts, gather intelligence about them in the various roads 
and fairways so that what is made wide looks ever smaller to 
them. This way, they will have no choice, but to die or embrace 
Islam. These Ayat (verses) allowed fighting people unless, and 
until, they embrace Islam and implement its rulings and 
obligations.  This honorable Ayah (verse 9:5) was called the 
Ayah of the Sword, about which Ad-Dahhak bin Muzahim 
said, “It abrogated every agreement of peace between the 
Prophet and any idolater, every treaty, and every term.” Al-
`Awfi said that Ibn `Abbas commented: “No idolater had any 
more treaty or promise of safety ever since Surah Bara'ah [this 
Surah] was revealed.” 99 
 
Commenting on verse 6 
“And if anyone of the Mushrikin, whom you were commanded 
to fight and We allowed you their blood and property, seeks 
your protection, asked you for safe passage, then accept his 
request until he hears the Words of Allah, the Qur'an.” Recite 
the Qur'an to him and mention a good part of the religion with 
which you establish Allah's proof against him (and then escort 
him to where he can be secure) and safe, until he goes back to 
his land, his home, and area of safety… When Musaylimah the 
Liar sent an emissary (Ibn An-Nawwahah) to the Messenger of 
Allah, he asked him, “Do you testify that Musaylimah is a 
messenger from Allah” He said, “Yes.” The Messenger of 
Allah said, “I would have cut off your head, if it was not that 
emissaries are not killed.”  When it became known that he (Ibn 
                                                          




An-Nawwahah) still testified that Musaylimah was a 
messenger from Allah, Ibn Mas`ud summoned him and said to 
him, “You are not delivering a message now!” He commanded 
that Ibn An-Nawwahah be decapitated.”100 
 
Commenting on verse 7 
Allah mentions the wisdom in dissolving all obligations to the 
idolaters and giving them a four month period of safety, after 
which they will meet the sharp sword wherever they are found. 
How can there be a covenant for the Mushrikin (idolaters), a 
safe resort and refuge, while they persist in Shirk with Allah, 
and disbelief in Him and His Messenger?”101 
 
Ma'ariful Quran 
Commenting on the entire chapter (Surah) 
This Surah proclaims freedom from any responsibility for the 
disbelievers and announces the withdrawal of peace and 
protection from those people - which is not fit for Bismillah (In 
the name of God)…The truth is that a war waged for Allah to 
implement His injunctions shall be what Jihad is.”102     
 
Commenting of verses 3 - 4 
Forcing weak people to leave a place without reasonable notice 
of evacuation, or attacking them without warning is cowardly, 
and very ignoble indeed. Whenever such an action has to be 
taken, it is necessary to make a public announcement first so 
that the affected people, who do not accept the law of the land, 
may get the time to go wherever they wished, freely and 
conveniently.  In case there is the need to annul a treaty of 
peace already made - which is permitted subject to some 
                                                          
100 Ibn Kathir. Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim 
http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2580&Itemid=64 
 
101 Ibn Kathir. Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim 
http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2579&Itemid=64 
 
102 Shafi. Vol 4 p 303 & 310 https://archive.org/download/maarifulquran-english-pdf/MaarifulquranEnglishPdf-
Vol4-Page001-708ByMuftiShafiUsmaniRah.pdf   
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conditions - it is far better to allow the treaty to remain valid 
until it expires automatically. 103 
 
Commenting of verse 5 
The fifth ruling from the cited verses tells us about the standard 
Muslim attitude towards the enemies of Islam. When 
confronted with enemies, Muslims should always keep in mind 
that they are no enemy to them personally. The truth of the 
matter is that they are opposed to their disbelief, which is 
actually the cause of their own loss in the present world as well 
as in the Hereafter. As for the opposition of Muslims to them, 
that too is really based on good wishes for them. Therefore, 
Muslims should never abandon the opportunity to give good 
counsel to them, whether in war or peace. This theme appears 
in these verses repeatedly. It promises real prosperity for them 
in this world and in the world to come, only if they were to 
rescind their thinking. The text does not leave it at that. It also 
warns them of the consequences: if they refused to repent and 
correct, they would not only be destroyed and killed in the 
present world but, they would also not escape their punishment 
even after death. It is interesting that, along with the 
proclamation of withdrawal (of peace) in these verses, the 
strain of sympathetic insistence also continues.”104 
 
Commenting on verse 6 
It is obligatory on Muslims that they should allow and protect 
anyone who comes to them to learn more about Islam…This 
injunction, according to Tafsir al-Qurtubi, is operative only in 
a situation when the purpose of the visitor is to listen to the 
Word of Allah and know more about Islam….In case, the 
objective of the visitor is business, or some other pursuit, it 
would depend on the discretion of relevant Muslim officials 
who would decide in terms of what is best in Muslim interests.  
                                                          
103 Shafi. Vol 4 p. 311 https://archive.org/download/maarifulquran-english-pdf/MaarifulquranEnglishPdf-Vol4-
Page001-708ByMuftiShafiUsmaniRah.pdf   
 
104 Ibid., p. 311 
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Should they deem it fit, they may permit and should they think 




 According to the Quran, when Muslims are faced with conflicting commands they are 
not supposed to simply choose the one they like best or follow the one that better reflects 
cultural norms of modern society.  Rather, they are to go to history (using the Hadith) and 
see which verse was revealed later since the Quran is not organized chronologically. 
Whichever verse came later is said to abrogate (or cancel) the earlier conflicting revelation.  
This doctrine is supported by Surah 2:106 and Surah 16:101 as well as the explanations of 
the mufassireen.  In 622 CE, when Muhammad and his followers migrated from Mecca to 
what is now known as Medina, he transformed from a mere prophet and spiritual guide to a 
recognized political and military leader.  Soon after began the systematic revelation of 
Quranic passages which contained commands to launch offensive attacks against unbelievers 
including Jews, Christians, and pagans.  Surah 9 is chronologically the second to last surah in 
the Quran and, as Ibn Kathir explained in his commentary, it is indeed the last surah that 
contains commands from Allah.  Therefore, it represents Allah’s final marching orders to his 
followers.  The aggressively violent, warlike passages in the Quran are almost exclusively 
found in the Medinan passages and subsequently abrogate the earlier Meccan passages which 
promote tolerance and acceptance. 
A survey of the militant Islamist literature revealed opposition to any system outside 
of Islam whether political, social, or economic.  The opposition is strongest against non-
Islamic religious systems such as Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, Mormonism, 
                                                          
105 Shafi. Vol 4 p. 315 https://archive.org/download/maarifulquran-english-pdf/MaarifulquranEnglishPdf-Vol4-
Page001-708ByMuftiShafiUsmaniRah.pdf   
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Buddhism, and Hinduism, all of which militant Islamists view as shirk.  According to Oxford 
Islamic Studies Online, which praises itself for being an “authoritative resource [that] brings 
together the best current scholarship in the field for students, scholars, government officials, 
community groups, and librarians to foster a more accurate and informed understanding of 
the Islamic world,”106 shirk is defined as a “theological term referring to the association of 
someone or something with God, that is, putting someone or something in the place of God, 
thus deviating from monotheism.”107  At the very least, militant Islamists appear to have a 
proper understanding of the word shirk.  Because the Quranic teaching of Christians is that 
they are actually polytheists who worship Allah, Jesus and even Mary as three separate and 
distinct gods, they are guilty of shirk.108  Despite the fact that Christians are actually 
monotheists and believe in one Triune God (the Trinity), which in no way includes Mary, 
they are nonetheless viewed as mushrikun.  The prophet of the Mormons, Joseph Smith, 
taught that there is a plurality of gods and that Mormons themselves could become gods.109  
Therefore Mormonism is considered shirk.  Buddha is considered an idol and there are well 
over a million deities in Hinduism, justifying the application of shirk to both of those 
religious ideologies as well.   
The criticism aimed at militant Islamists does not center on their application of the 
word shirk to various world religions, but instead on what they believe should be done with 
                                                          
106 “About Oxford Islamic Studies Online.” In The Oxford Diction of Islam, edited by John L. Esposito. Oxford 
Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/Public/about.html 
 
107 "Shirk." In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam edited by John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2195 (accessed 22-Jul-2018) 
 
108 Surah 5:73 and Surah 5:116 
 




mushrikun.  Militant Islamists like IS believe that “committing shirk with Allah is a sin that 
makes one permissible to be killed.”110  Unless a mushrik pays the jizyah (religious tax) and 
thereby enters into dhimmah (protection), their necks should be struck “until slaughter has 
been inflicted upon them.”111  Once again, the plain reading of Surah 9:5 appears to 
command Muslims to “kill the Mushrikun wherever you find them.”  If a mushrik repents, 
which seems to imply forsaking his idolatry and accepting Islam, he is to be set free.  
Acknowledging a lack of formal Quranic education and the potential for biases, this 
researcher must turn to those qualified to explain the meaning of the Quran.  “Qualified” is 
not simply a characteristic attributed to one’s devote Muslim co-worker nor does it mean a 
professor with a PhD in Islamic Studies.   It does not even mean the imam of the local 
mosque, unless of course he is qualified as a mufassir.  All of these individuals are free to 
explain what they believe certain Quranic passages mean.  However, if their explanation 
conflicts with the explanation of an established mufassir, it is they that are in error and not 
the mufassir.  When one reads Ibn Kathir’s explanation that mushrikun should be fought on 
earth in general until they die or embrace Islam, it is difficult to conclude that the Quranic 
verse in question has some esoteric meaning other than the one provided by the plain reading 
of the text.  What message should a Muslim take away from Mufti Muhammad Shafi’s 
explanation that a person is an enemy of Islam simply because of his or her disbelief and 
subsequently as an enemy they should be destroyed and killed?  How should a Muslim 
respond to this seemingly harsh Quranic teaching when he reads that his own prophet, whom 
he is supposed to emulate, said that Allah has ordered him to fight people until they all 
                                                          
110 Islamic State. “The Ruling of the Belligerent Christians.” Rumiyah V 9 4 May 2017 p. 5 
 
111 Islamic State. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone.” Dabiq V 7 12 February 2015  
p. 21 
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worship Allah and that the end of days would not come unless Muslims fight against Jews 
and kill them? 
As it concerns shirk and the militant Islamists’ attitude toward mushrikun, the Quran, 
once again supported by the explanations of renowned mufassireen and the teachings of 
Muhammad himself, appears to lend legitimate credence to the militants’ interpretation and 
application of these particular surahs.   
Quran 
Let not the believers take the disbelievers as Auliya 
(supporters, helpers, etc.) instead of the believers, and whoever 
does that will never be helped by Allah in any way, except if 
you indeed fear a danger from them. And Allah warns you 
against Himself (His Punishment), and to Allah is the final 
return. (Surah 3:28) 
 
O you who believe! Do not take the Jews and the Christians for 
friends; they are friends of each other; and whoever amongst 
you takes them for a friend, then surely he is one of them; 
surely Allah does not guide the unjust people. (Surah 5:51) 
 
Those who reject Truth, among the People of the Book (Jews 
and Christians) and among the polytheists, will be in Hell-Fire, 
to dwell therein for aye.  They are the worst of creatures. 
(Surah 98:6) 
 
Exegesis (authoritative explanations)  
 
Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim  
Commenting on Surah 3:28  
Allah prohibited His believing servants from becoming 
supporters of the disbelievers, or to take them as comrades with 
whom they develop friendships, rather than the believers. 
Whoever commits this act that Allah has prohibited, then Allah 
will discard him.  Except those believers who in some areas or 
times fear for their safety from the disbelievers. In this case, 
such believers are allowed to show friendship to the 
disbelievers outwardly, but never inwardly. For instance, Al-
Bukhari recorded that Abu Ad-Darda' said, ‘We smile in the 
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face of some people although our hearts curse them.’' Al-
Bukhari said that Al-Hasan said, ‘The Tuqyah112 is allowed 
until the Day of Resurrection.’”113 
 
Commenting on Surah 5:51 
Allah forbids His believing servants from having Jews and 
Christians as friends, because they are the enemies of Islam 
and its people, may Allah curse them. Allah then states that 
they are friends of each other and He gives a warning threat to 
those who do this.114 
 
Commenting on Surah 98:6 
Allah informs of what will happen to the wicked disbelievers 
among the People of the Scripture and the idolaters who 
oppose Allah's divinely revealed Books and the Prophets 
whom He sent […] they are the worst creation that Allah has 
fashioned and created.115 
 
Ma'ariful Quran 
Commenting of Surah 3:28 
In these verses, Muslims have been instructed not to take 
disbelievers as their friends.  Those who act against this 
instruction have been sternly warned: Those who take them as 
friends will find that their bond of love and friendship with 
Allah has been cut off.  Any emotionally involved friendship 
that comes from the heart is absolutely forbidden (Haram).  
However, a formal friendship at the level of mutual dealings is, 
no doubt, permissible; but, that too is not favored if 
unnecessary...To sum up, as for the four degrees of relations 
with non-Muslims, we know  that friendship which binds a 
                                                          
112 The word tuqyah (often written as taqiyya) means “concealment” or “deception.”  The idea is that Muslims 
are not allowed to be friends with non-Muslims unless they feel threatened by a stronger adversary in which 
case they are allowed to feign friendship. 
 
113 Ibn Kathir. Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim 
http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=550&Itemid=46 
 
114 Ibn Kathir. Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim 
http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=767&Itemid=60 
 
115 Ibn Kathir. Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim 
http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1099&Itemid=154 
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Muslim in very close ties with non-Muslims is not permissible 
under any condition.  Relations based on benevolence, humane 
interest and concern are permitted with all but the belligerent 
ones.  Similarly, politeness and friendly treatment is also 
permissible when the purpose is to entertain a guest, convey 
Islamic teachings to non-Muslims or to stay safe against being 
hurt or harmed by them.116 
 
Commenting of Surah 5:51 
Muslims have been commanded not to enter into Muwalat 
(deep friendship) with Jews and Christians as is customary 
practice of non-Muslims in general and, of Jews and Christians 
in particular, who reserve deep friendship for their own people 
only...After this clear instruction, should a Muslim do 
otherwise and enter into an intimate friendship with a Jew or 
Christian, then, in the sight of Islam, he is fit to be counted as 
one of them – and not as a Muslim. 
 
Shafi does not comment on Surah 98:6 
 
Tafsir al-Mizan (Shi’a tafsir) 
Commenting on Surah 3:28 
If the word “unbelievers”, coming at the beginning of these 
verses, covers the People of the Book too, then these verses 
forbid the believers to befriend, and fraternize with, the 
polytheists and the People of the Book all together; if it refers 
to the polytheists only, then the verses admonish the believers 
not to be friendly with them; instead they should join the party 
of Allah, loving Him and His Apostle….In this verse, taking 
the unbelievers for friends means establishing a psychological 
rapport with them. Such a friendship would taint the believer’s 
vision, and would adversely affect his thoughts and character, 
encouraging him to follow his unbeliever friends in his life and 
manners. The clause, ‘rather than the believers’, points to this 
fact. It refers to a stage when the believer prefers the 
unbelievers rather than the believers as the object of his love 
and as the model for his life; the more he moves nearer to his 
                                                          




unbeliever friends, the more he distances himself from the 
believers…Belief and disbelief are diametrically opposed to 
each other; they can never reconcile. Their thoughts and deeds, 
their spiritual journey towards Allah, and in short their whole 
being would be totally different from the opposite party. Such a 
position is not in harmony with that of friendship; because 
friendship demands unity and rapport….That is why Allah 
warned them in the next sentence, “and whoever does this, he 
shall have nothing (to do) with Allah.” Then comes the 
exception of taqiyyah, because taqiyyah is only a show of love, 
not its reality…The Qur’an and the sunnah both agree that 
taqiyyah is permissible in places. Also, reason supports it. The 
main purpose of the religion and the Apostle is to keep the 
truth alive; and sometimes this purpose can be achieved by 
practicing taqiyyah, by keeping good relations with the 
enemies of the religion, while discarding taqiyyah would serve 
no purpose at all. It is a reality which no reasonable man can 
deny.”117 
 
Commenting on Surah 5:51 
In a nutshell, Allah warns the believers against taking the Jews 
and the Christians for friends, and threatens them most 
severely; then points in an apocalyptical way where such 
friendship was to take them and how it would turn into ruins 
the magnificent structure of religious character; then Allah will 
bring on scene a people who will manage the affairs and 
restore the religion's structure to its original splendor.118  Allah, 
the Sublime, in His words: "do not take the Jews and the 
Christians for friends", has not put any condition or speciality 
on friendship; it is unrestricted [and as such should be 
prohibiting any kind of nearness].119  Thus, the clause: “do not 
take the Jews and the Christians for awliyã’,” clearly forbids 
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loving them or having any affection towards them; because 
such feelings pull the souls and spirits towards each other and 
it creates mutual moral effects on both sides; and if Muslims 
are influenced by un-Islamic behavior, their society will 
diverge from its religious way (which is based on the felicity of 
following the truth) to the way of unbelief (which is based on 
following the low desires and worshipping the Satan); and thus 
it will go astray from the path of the natural life.120 
 




 The conclusion drawn by militant Islamists from Surah 3:28 and Suarh 5:51 in 
regards to close association with unbelievers, specifically with Jews and Christians, appears 
to be well reflected in the explanations of the mufassireen.  IS has proclaimed that merely 
“sitting silently with the [disbelievers] during a gathering of [disbelief] is [disbelief].”121  It 
seems reasonable to conclude that when someone in pursuit of puritanical Islamic thinking 
reads how the renowned mufassir Ibn Kathir explained the above-cited verses, he would 
come away with an unfriendly, if not downright hostile, disposition towards Jews and 
Christians as well as towards professing Muslims that have befriended Jews or Christians.  
From the perspective of this researcher, based on the supporting authoritative text it would be 
unfair to label militant Islamist interpretations of these Quranic verses as a radical departure 
from the true intent of the text.  Doing so would be to also label Islam’s preeminent scholar 
and historian as grossly mistaken in his understanding of Allah’s revelation.  That would be a 
difficult argument to win considering the respect his writings have within the ummah.   While 
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the commentaries in his tafsir may seem extreme to non-believers, Ibn Kathir’s writings are 
recommended to 7th grade American Muslim students as “one of the four most important 
treatments of the Quran and life of Muhammad.”122  While Shafi’s and Tabataba'i’s 
explanations certainly have a softer tone, they nonetheless conclude that any amicable 
relationship with Jews or Christians for other than pragmatic purposes is strictly forbidden.   
The reader should notice how the mufassireen in their explanations above pass 
judgment on professing Muslims that enter into close friendship or alliance with non-
Muslims.  Such a person, per their explanation, is himself no longer a Muslim.  He is 
discarded by Allah and is counted as an unbeliever with all its “perks.”  This is known as 
takfir – the “pronouncement that someone is an unbeliever (kafir) and no longer Muslim.”123  
IS has been accused of misapplying takfir in their pronouncement of professing Muslims as 
unbelievers and subsequently executing them due to their alliance with or tacit support of the 
United States and other western powers.   Those accusing IS of misapplication of this 
concept, when Allah says “whoever amongst you takes [an unbeliever] for a friend, then 
surely he is one of them,” need to demonstrate how it means something different from its 
apparent meaning and from how the mufassireen explain it and the militants apply it. 
The lack of divergence in the interpretation and explanation of these mufassireen, 
despite their varying backgrounds, is strongly connected to the idea of bid’ah, which 
linguistically means “innovation” or “novelty” but in religious matters it refers to heretical 
                                                          
122 Coughlin, p. 63 referring to Yahiya Emerick’s What Islam is all About: A Student Textbook (Grades 7 to 12), 
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123 “Takfir.” In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam edited by John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 
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doctrine (heresy).  In Islam, bid’ah refers to some earthly injection of meaning or doctrine to 
supersede that which Allah intended.  Within Islam, heretics are considered cursed and 
ultimately destined for rejection on the Day of Resurrection.  We read the following words of 
Muhammad as recorded in the two most famous and authentic hadith: 
 “So whoever innovates in it [Islam] a heresy (bid’ah) or 
commits a crime in it or gives shelter to such an innovator, will 
incur the curse of Allah, the angels and all the people, and none 
of his compulsory or optional good deeds will be accepted on 
the Day of Resurrection.”124 
 
“He who innovates or gives protection to an innovator, there is 
a curse of Allah and that of His angels and that of the whole 
humanity upon him.”125 
 
In light of the Islamic view of bid’ah, any attempts to reexamine the Islamic texts or to 
counter the established authoritative explanations of the mufassireen are inhibited because 
such explanations would be viewed not only as non-authoritative but heretical.   
The author of this thesis grants that all parties cited above could be mistaken in their 
understanding of the Quran.  Logically everyone cannot be right, but everyone could be 
wrong.  The militant Islamists could be mistaken in their understanding and application of 
seemingly violent Quranic texts despite the qualified scholarship supporting their 
interpretation.  Perhaps our Muslim coworkers, colleagues, neighbors, and friends indeed 
have a better understanding of the true meaning of the text.  Whatever the case, it is 
irrelevant.  In constructing a PSYOP campaign to influence the thoughts and behaviors of our 
militant Islamist adversary, it would not matter what Allah really meant in his abstruse yet 
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otherwise crystal-clear instructions to his followers.  The reason for this irrelevance will be 






































CHAPTER VII  
 
A RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE CRITICISM 
 
 Those who are most vocal in their accusations against the Islamic State and like-
minded groups also use the Quran to support their position, supposedly proving their version 
of Islam to be correct as opposed to the Islam practiced by militant Islamists.  This chapter 
will present the common arguments this researcher has found against the militant Islamists’ 
“non-Islamic” beliefs and behavior.  Once again the mufassireen will be relied upon to 
provide clarification and insight into the proper, or at the very least a legitimate, 
understanding of the text and will serve to either validate or refute the criticism provided 
against the militant Islamist position. 
 Some contemporary Islamic scholars criticize militant Islamist groups for their 
violent tactics.  Often times these scholars cite Surah 2:256 as a repudiation of militant 
behavior.  One such scholar is CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, a Middle East Foreign Affairs 
Officer in the Navy and current Chair of Islamic Studies at the National Defense University.  
Aboul-Enein claims that the militant Islamist worldview “breaks down in the face of verses 
that declare there shall be no compulsion in religion” siting specifically Surah 2:256.126  The 
verse reads as follows:   
There is no compulsion in religion. Verily, the Right Path has 
become distinct from the wrong path. 
 
                                                          
126 Youssef Aboul-Enein. Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat. Naval Institute Press, 
2011 p. 73 
53 
Aboul-Enein’s claim is that the imposition of Islam by force goes against the Quranic 
injunction of not coercing people to accept a certain religion, in this case Islam, as stated in 
Surah 2:256.  Therefore, the argument goes, groups like IS are going against true Quranic 
Islam when they kill people for their unbelief or perceived apostasy. The more than one 
hundred Muslim scholars that have signed the Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi also cite this verse 
to denounce the actions of the Islamic State.  In the letter, the scholars claim that the Islamic 
State has gone against the Quran by coercing “people to convert to Islam just as [it has] 
coerced Muslims to accept [its] views.”127  This researcher agrees with Aboul-Enein’s and 
the other scholars’ interpretation of the verse but not with their claim.  The Islamic State does 
not provide its captives or the residents of conquered territory with the sole option of 
converting to Islam or be killed.  The group provides for kafirin (unbelievers) to enter into 
aman, the condition of dhimmah (protection) granted to those who pay the jizyah (religious 
tax).128  There is a distinct difference between 1) imposing Islam by force in the sense of 
imposing Shari’a law, enforcing the jizyah, and killing those who do not comply and 2) 
forcing someone to actually convert to Islam in the sense of worshiping Allah and following 
the spiritual guidance of Muhammad.  It would seem that militant Islamists understand Surah 
2:256 as forbidding the latter while providing provisions for the former.  Ibn Kathir 
expounded on this verse in his tafsir with the following: 
Do not force anyone to become Muslim, for Islam is plain and 
clear, and its proofs and evidence are plain and clear. 
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Therefore, there is no need to force anyone to embrace 
Islam.129 
 
The preeminent Islamic scholar and historian, which by the way is exactly what Aboul-Enein 
considers Ibn Kathir to be,130 explained that this verse is to be understood as meaning there is 
no need to force anyone to believe in Allah and convert to Islam.  His thoughts on how to 
behave towards apostates and unbelievers were already made clear in the previous chapter.  
Muhammad Shafi in his tafsir addressed the seemingly conflicting natures of Quranic verses 
that command Muslims to fight on one hand and verses like Surah 2:256 which state that 
there is no compulsion in religion: 
Keeping this verse in view, some people raise objections. They 
say this verse tells us that there is no compulsion in faith, 
although the teaching of jihad and qital (fighting) in Islam 
appears contrary to this principle.  Looking at this a little 
carefully, we can find out that the objection is not valid, since 
the teaching of jihad and qital in Islam is not to coerce people 
into accepting Faith.  Had it been so, why would there be 
Islamic injunctions of jizyah to provide an umbrella of security 
for kuffar (disbelievers) which protects their life, property and 
honour?  In fact, this is to remove disorder, strife or fasad 
[mischief, disorder], for Allah Almighty dislikes fasad, which 
is what the kuffar are after. Therefore, Allah Almighty says: 
And they go about the earth spreading disorder and Allah does 
not like those who spread disorder (Surah 5:54). It is for this 
reason that Allah Almighty has ordained that the fasad created 
by these people should be removed by jihiid and qital.  So, 
killing such people [disbelievers and others causing disorder] is 
like the killing of serpents, scorpions and their harmful likes.131 
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It would be erroneous to think that the Islamic State forces people to convert to Islam without 
providing the option of aman.  As presented in their own literature, unbelievers can convert 
or pay the religious tax.  If the unbelievers refuse to do either then the militant Islamists of 
the Islamic State are themselves compelled to fight against unbelief in order to “remove 
disorder, strife or fasad” exactly as Shafi explained in his tafsir.  While these same militants 
are called to be merciful in cases of genuine repentance, this researcher acknowledges that 
these calls for mercy are not often granted.  However, it is entirely likely that in the militant 
line of thinking, when propagated by fighting and fear, there can be no genuine repentance 
and acceptance of any Islamic idea.  Therefore, conversion under such circumstances would 
be seen by the militants as disingenuous making mercy inapplicable or at least left up to the 
discretion of the militants. 
 Aboul-Enein submits another accusation against militant Islamist organizations in 
regards to suicide bombings.  The claim is that Surah 2:195 refutes the idea of suicide attacks 
of any kind and therefore Islam rejects suicide bombings as a legitimate tactic, ergo the 
Islamic State is un-Islamic.132  The verse reads as follows:  
And spend of your substance in the cause of Allah, and make 
not your own hands contribute to [your] destruction; but do 
good; for Allah loveth those who do good.   
 
The argument is that the statement “make not your own hands contribute to your destruction” 
is an injunction specifically against suicide and therefore suicide bombings are impermissible 
per the Quran.  However, turning once again to the preeminent Islamic scholar, readers are 
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faced with a different, authoritative explanation of this verse.  Ibn Kathir provided a succinct 
explanation of what Allah meant by the word destruction: “destruction refers to staying with 
families and estates and abandoning Jihad.”133  Muhammad Shafi expounded on this verse in 
more detail: 
What does the expression, “put yourselves into destruction”, 
mean here? Commentators have explained it in different ways. 
The blessed Companion, Abu Ayyub al-Ansari: “This verse 
was revealed about us. We can explain it best. It was when 
Allah gave Islam authority and power, we started talking that 
'Jihad' was not necessary any more, and that we could stay 
home and take care of our wealth and property.” Thereupon, 
this verse was revealed which made it clear that “destruction” 
at this place means “the abandonment of jihad.” […]  The same 
approach to the meaning of this verse has been reported from 
the earliest authorities in Tafsir, such as Sayyidna Ibn Abbas, 
Hudhayfah, Qatadah, Mujahid, and Dahhak.134 
 
The mufassireen explain this verse on “self-destruction” as opposition to abandoning jihad in 
order to take care of personal affairs or to spend time with family.  Admittedly, Shafi does 
hint at the idea that this verse could be understood as speaking against “suicide” but only in 
the sense of an individual putting himself in a situation where he will obviously be killed 
without being able to inflict any damage upon the enemy.  He wrote: 
Still others think that the verse makes it unlawful to throw 
oneself into an offensive fighting in a situation when it is 
already obvious that one will be unable to do anything against 
the enemy other than dying at their hands.135 
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Such a scenario would be inapplicable to suicide bombings because in suicide bombings the 
enemy (ie. targeted audience) indeed suffers loss. 
 Finally, those who wish to portray militant Islamists as un-Islamic attempt to prove 
that the Quran clearly condemns killing of any kind, seemingly ignoring all together the life 
of their prophet and concluding therefore that Islam is indeed a religion of peace.  This is the 
case of Arsalan Iftikhar, an international human rights lawyer, global media commentator 
and author of the 2011 book Islamic Pacifism and 2016 book Scapegoats: How Islamophobia 
Helps Our Enemies and Threatens Our Freedoms.  In addition, he is a faculty member at 
Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.  In 2009, after the 
Fort Hood incident, Arsalan published an article for CNN titled Murder has no religion. His 
article began with a reference to Surah 5:32:  
Most of the world’s 1.57 billion Muslims know that the Holy 
Quran states quite clearly that, “Anyone who kills a human 
being … it shall be as though he has killed all of mankind… If 
anyone saves a life, it shall be as though he has saved the lives 
of all of mankind.” 136   
 
The scholars of the Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi also cite this verse and use it to chide the 
Islamic State for killing “many innocents who were neither combatants nor armed, just 
because they disagreed” with the group’s ideology.137  The verse in its entirety reads as 
follows:  
For this reason did We prescribe to the children of Israel that 
whoever slays a soul, unless it be for manslaughter or for 
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mischief in the land, it is as though he slew all men; and 
whoever keeps it alive, it is as though he kept alive all men; 
and certainly Our messengers came to them with clear 
arguments, but even after that many of them certainly act 
extravagantly in the land.  
 
Two points are worthy of particular attention in this passage.  Firstly, the teaching appealed 
to by Arsalan Iftikhar (“whoever slays a soul . . . it is as though he slew all men”) was given 
“to the children of Israel” (i.e. the Jews) who, according to Islam, received an earlier set of 
scriptures.  Bear in mind, earlier revelation can be abrogated by subsequent revelation should 
the two conflict.  Secondly, even if certain individuals wish to apply this verse to Muslims, 
when read in context with the very next verse it is in fact a chilling warning to unbelievers.  
The passage clearly permits killing people who spread “mischief in the land.”  The next verse 
reads as follows:   
The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His 
messenger and strive to make mischief in the land is only this, 
that they should be murdered or crucified or their hands and 
their feet should be cut off on opposite sides or they should be 
imprisoned; this shall be as a disgrace for them in this world, 
and in the hereafter they shall have a grievous chastisement. 
(Surah 5:33) 
 
In light of this stipulation, it becomes necessary to then determine what the expressions 
“wage war against Allah” and “make mischief in the land” actually mean.  Starting with the 
latter, the Arabic word for spreading mischief is fasad.  Oliver Leaman, a Professor of 
Philosophy specializing in Islamic, Jewish and Eastern philosophy, defined fasad in his 2009 
book titled Islamic Philosophy as “moral corruption against Allah.”138  In Sahih al-Bukhairi, 
one of the Kutub al-Sittah (authentic hadith collections), fasad is closely linked to “worldly 
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wealth and pleasures.”139  Since Jews, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and atheists all reject 
shari’a law -- Allah’s standard of morality -- they all meet the “mischief-making” criterion of 
moral corruption against Allah by rejecting his moral law and commands and spreading 
corruption via the preaching of a different message (Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, 
Hinduism, secularism).  In regards to the expression “wage war against Allah,” Islam’s 
preeminent scholar, Ibn Kathir, explained the following: 
“Wage war” mentioned here means oppose and contradict, and 
it includes disbelief, blocking roads and spreading fear in the 
fairways.  Mischief in the land refers to various types of evil… 
This Ayah does not save a Muslim from punishment if he kills, 
causes mischief in the land or wages war against Allah and His 
Messenger and then joins rank with the disbelievers, before the 
Muslims are able to catch him. He will still be liable for 
punishment for the crimes he committed…The correct opinion 
is that this Ayah [verse] is general in meaning and includes the 
idolaters and all others who commit the types of crimes the 
Ayah mentioned…This view supports the opinion that these 
Ayat [verses] were revealed about the idolaters…. “That is 
their disgrace in this world,” meaning, shame, humiliation, 
punishment, contempt and torment in this life, before the 
Hereafter.”140 
 
In the 1981 Shia tafsir, Tafsir al-Mizan, Mufti Tabataba’i explained the expression “wage 
war against Allah” in a similar fashion: 
Waging war against Allah: It is impossible to take it in its 
literal sense; it can only be interpreted metaphorically. But the 
metaphorical meaning is very wide and it can be applied on 
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disobeying any rule of the shari‘ah and on every injustice and 
extravagance.141 
 
Once again, an authoritative scholar qualified to interpret the Quran, explained that “waging 
war against Allah” can simply refer to disobeying any rule of shari’ah law, the basic Islamic 
legal system derived from the religious precepts of Islam.  Of course, if someone is not a 
Muslim he inherently does not adhere to shari’ah.  Therefore, by this standard, he would be 
considered to be waging war against Allah simply for his rejection of shari’ah.  By using the 
explanations provided by the mufassireen, the authoritative experts on explaining and 
understating the Quran, Surah 5:33 could be read as “The punishment of those who 
contradict and oppose Allah and His messenger and strive to live a life contrary to that 
prescribed by Allah is only this – that they should be murdered.”  It needs to be emphasized 
that this researcher is not siding with militant Islamists and their beliefs.  The logical 
progression of each chapter is meant to simply and clearly demonstrate the ease at which the 
militant Islamist worldview can be supported by Islam’s authoritative texts.  
 The arguments and accusations against the beliefs and behavior of militant Islamists 
do not suffice to refute the militant Islamist worldview when viewed in light of authoritative 
exegesis.  These beliefs and behavior have been settled through ijma (scholarly consensus)142 
and can no longer be subjected to ijtihad (independent reasoning).  In expectation of 
accusations of cherry-picking passages and scholars to support a point, the following defense 
is given.  In regards to passages, this paper has used those passages promoted by the militants 
Islamists themselves as being in support of their beliefs and behavior.  This paper has simply 
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viewed those passages in the light of renowned and widely-accepted exegesis.  In regards to 
the choice of scholars, Chapter VI goes into great detail on the qualifications of mufassireen.  
There are more than 20 multi-volume classic Sunni tafsir in Arabic alone.  In searching for a 
widely recognized and accepted tafsir, Ibn Kathir’s work was continually praised.143  
Fortunately for this researcher, Ibn Kathir’s tafsir has been translated into English--a 
necessary characteristic of all the tafsir considered in this paper.  Also, in selecting tafsir for 
this paper, this researcher aimed at representing the broad spectrum of Islamic thought from 
various time periods.  Therefore, this paper also draws from the contemporary Sunni tafsir 
Ma’ariful Quran as well as a contemporary Shia tafsir by Tabataba’i who is considered by 
many to be the greatest philosopher in the contemporary Shia world.144 
While only a subset of tafsir written since the 7th century, the three mufassireen and 
their respective tafsir cited in this paper nonetheless represent preeminence in Islamic 
exegesis. Their explanations of the specific passages often cited by militant Islamists in no 
way demonstrate that the Islamic State or like-minded groups behave and operate in a fashion 
that could be condemned with absolute authority as being non-Islamic.   When the Quran 
appears to make the case for both tolerance and for intolerance, the passage that came last 
effectively abrogates the previous revelation.145  The uncompromising nature of Allah’s final 
commands (Surah 9), which includes Allah’s final words on issues relating to war, peace, 
jihad and submission, means that “abrogation […] skews Quranic interpretation to the 
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militant side.” 146  As militant Islamists continue to promulgate their beliefs, including the 
duty to fight and kill, to an increasingly receptive audience and demonstrate through 
authoritative scholars the legitimacy of those beliefs, “it must be assumed that the population 
will develop a deep understanding of those duties.” 147  Ultimately, using peaceful, pluralistic 
sounding Quranic passages to oppose the militant Islamist ideology appears to be a fruitless 
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THE UNITED STATES’ CURRENT PSYOP APPROACH 
 
This chapter of the thesis will focus on key elements in the United States’ current 
approach to psychological operations against militant Islamism.  The approach will be 
examined through the lens of the analysis conducted above.  A determination will be made at 
the end of this chapter regarding whether or not the United States’ current PSYOP strategy is 
appropriate for influencing the cognitive domain of our militant Islamist adversary and 
subsequently changing their worldview to one that produces behavior more favorable to U.S. 
national security objectives. 
On March 15, 2015, a USAF F-16 dropped tens of thousands of propaganda leaflets 
in support of an operation aimed at discouraging people from joining militant Islamist 
groups, in this case the Islamic State.148   According to the Pentagon spokesman at the time, 
Colonel Steve Warren, “the message of this leaflet [was] that if you allow yourself to be 
recruited, you will find yourself in a meat grinder… It’s not beneficial to your health.”149  
The psychological effect sought after was fear and intimidation.  The logic behind this 
approach was the assumption that if a person feared death, and death was certain for those 
fighting on the side of IS, then the recruiting and retention efforts of IS would suffer.  
However, the Colonel failed to explain how the threat of death would influence a group of 
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people who proudly profess to love death more than the rest of us love life.  For militant 
Islamists, death is not an unfortunate consequence; it is their goal.150  In multiple places in 
the authentic hadith Sahih al-Bukhari, Muhammed is recorded as saying the following: 
I would love to be martyred in Allah's Cause and then get 
resurrected and then get martyred, and then get resurrected 
again and then get martyred and then get resurrected again and 
then get martyred.151 
 
Muhammed’s desire to be resurrected again was not based on the opportunity to achieve a 
specific goal but based instead on the opportunity to be martyred again. 
Prior to the Department of Defense’s leaflet dropping operation, the Department of 
State executed its own online influence campaign known as “Think Again, Turn Away.”  
This effort, under the direction of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications 
(CSCC), utilized social media outlets such as Twitter and YouTube as a platform to 
demonstrate militant Islamism’s supposed lack of connection to true Islamic ideology.  
Personnel from the center engaged in Twitter conversations with jihadi fighters and their 
supporters, attempting to contest their claims and dissuade others from adopting the militant 
Islamist worldview.152  This effort also included quoting people like Mike Haines, the brother 
of a slain British aid worker.  Mr. Haines was quoted on the campaign’s Twitter page as 
saying “to my limited knowledge, Islam is about peace, it's about love.”  Unfortunately, this 
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strategy was seen not only as ineffective but as an embarrassment.  Militant Islamists 
apparently do not accept exegesis of the Quran from individuals like Mr. Haines. 153    
In 2016, the U.S. State Department launched the Global Engagement Center which is 
“charged with leading the U.S. government’s efforts to counter propaganda and 
disinformation from international terrorist organizations and foreign countries.”154 Much of 
the center’s work appears to be classified so it is not possible to exhaustively cover all the 
methods it uses to carry out its mission.  However, some of its public initiatives shed light on 
the center’s approach to decreasing the appeal of IS and preventing recruitment of new 
members.  The center published multiple videos on YouTube with one series that juxtaposed 
“the images of life in IS-held cities released by Islamic State with images and videos 
recorded covertly by civilians and reporters in the area.”155  While these videos discredit the 
claim of a utopian Caliphate, effective governance is not fundamental to the militant Islamist 
identity.156  A second series produced by the center focused on testimonies from defectors 
and their feelings of manipulation and betrayal on the part of IS.  The Global Engagement 
Center may have certainly achieved the psychological effect of delegitimizing aspects of the 
Islamic State’s claims and introducing skepticism into the minds of some would-be jihadis.  
However, as with the first series, these videos do not “target the elements of the Islamic State 
that are essential to its identity”157 – its core ideology.   
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Third party affinity groups, such as the “hacktivist” organization Anonymous have 
even tried their hand at countering the militant Islamist ideology.  Anonymous released a 
video warning the Islamic State that it would “be treated like a virus,” with Anonymous, of 
course, being the cure.158  Subsequently, Anonymous successfully shut down approximately 
800 Twitter accounts and 12 Facebook accounts.159  The psychological effect inflicted on IS 
with the closure of their Twitter, Youtube and Facebook accounts was not one that elicited 
fear or doubt.  Instead IS made a bold declaration of vengeance, threatening that the virtual 
war conducted against the group would lead to a real war against employees of the afore 
mentioned internet sites.160 
The ineffectiveness of the above PSYOP strategies is directly related to the lack of 
understanding by military leaders, State Department officials, and non-state actors alike 
concerning what actually persuades or motivates militant Islamists.  In the militant Islamist 
worldview the “meat grinder” is not feared, it is welcomed.  Certainly, the opinions and 
interpretations expressed by people like Mike Haines, who admit to possessing limited 
knowledge and absolutely no exegetical authority whatsoever, are easily dismissed, rejected, 
and even scoffed at by militant Islamists and those who sympathize with their cause.   
Despite the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on U.S. psychological influence 
operations, the United States has made little or no progress in countering the ideology of al-
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Qaeda, the Islamic State or any other militant Islamist group.161  While the United States is 
succeeding in killing its enemies, its psychological operations are not persuasive, its strategy 
is ineffective and the militant Islamist ideology continues to be promulgated and accepted.  
For each militant Islamist jihadi killed, there is another eager to replace him.  The ideas the 
United States and its partners are proposing to the militants or would-be militants are not 
persuading them to abandon their worldview.  The United States has based its 
PSYOP/influence operations on the theory that militant Islamist jihadis have “perverted a 
major religion into a hateful worldview”162 and subsequently it has attempted to challenge 
the militants’ interpretation of that religion.  A 2008 issue of the CTC Sentinel shows that 
this line of thinking has roots over a decade old.  In an article titled “A Global Counter-
Insurgency Campaign Plan for the War on Terror”, Colonel James Johnson proposed that the 
United States counter-terrorism campaign’s overarching effort should be Information 
Operations (the umbrella under which PSYOP falls).163  He explains that an IO-based 
campaign would erode the legitimacy of “radical Islamic ideology” by “neutralizing the 
ability of radical Islamic organizations to use an extremist interpretation of Islam to justify 
the use of terrorism in pursuit of their aims” and showing the “hypocrisy of terrorism as a 
religiously approved tactic.” 164   The United States has correctly identified the enemy’s 
center of gravity – its ideology.  However, when comparing and contrasting what the United 
States claims about the ideology and what authoritative scholars, specifically the 
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mufassireen, have written throughout the years, it appears that the United States and its 
partners have an uninformed, or perhaps misinformed, view of this ideology.   
There are nonetheless many contemporary scholars whose understanding and practice 
of Islam drastically deviates from the militant Islamist understanding of true Islam.  As 
mentioned previously, a letter that was addressed to Abu Barkar Al-Baghdadi in September 
2014 and is now, as this thesis is being completed, signed by 172 scholars, strives for a 
theological refutation of the beliefs and practices of the Islamic State.165  It has not worked.  
In fact, since the letter was published the Islamic State in turn has published Dabiq and 
Rumiyah, 25 publications in total, rife with Quranic passages and commentary from tafsir 
supporting its theological position.  In the eyes of militant Islamists, the support for their 
position is so overwhelmingly clear in Islam’s authoritative texts and renowned exegesis that 
they do not even flinch when the global religious community states that IS has nothing to do 
with Islam.  Moderates do not have a monopoly on scholarly support – and neither do the 
militants.  However, it is only from a completely misinformed position that someone can 
claim that militant Islamists in no way/shape/form are justified in their interpretation and 
concomitant behavior.  Such absolute statements as “IS has nothing to do with Islam” mean 
nothing and do nothing for the United States’ efforts against militant Islamism. 
Ultimately it does not matter if the militant Islamists like IS are deviants or not.  It 
does not matter if their beliefs are a true reflection of what the Quran teaches or not.  What 
matters is that they have authoritative, exegetical firepower behind their beliefs.  The 
historical textual support for their belief system is astounding.  Their appeal is deeply rooted 
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in the Islamic source texts; they “have not constructed for themselves a doctrine ex nihilo.”166  
The militants’ justification for fighting and killing finds full expression in the Islamic texts 
and the writings of recognized authorities whereas the current approach taken to change the 
militants’ minds “finds no support able to challenge the doctrinal supremacy that the 
[militant Islamists] enjoy.” 167  Despite this, many Western policymakers deny the religious 
legitimacy of militant Islamism and try to discredit militant Islamists using the very same 
source texts. 168   The inability of U.S. policy-makers and leaders within the Department of 
Defense and Department of State to properly understand the teachings of the Quran and 
subsequently execute effective psychological operations when authoritative explanations are 
so readily available must mean that their ignorance is either a) intentional due to their lack of 
a desire to study and learn what is written, b) possibly wishful thinking c) the result of 
oppressive political correctness, or d) due to a combination of all of the above.  Regardless of 
the reason, the result is the same – ignorance and ineffective strategies.  Without a proper 
understanding of militant Islamism and its connection to traditional, historical Islam, U.S. 
policy-makers cannot even hope to develop and execute an effective ideological 
counterattack.  The United States and its allies will fail every time if they attempt to use 
contemporary, moderate explanations of the Islamic texts to promote its counter-ideology 
and delegitimize the militant Islamist worldview.  The United States and its allies will fail if 
they continue to proclaim that there are numerous different interpretations of Islam but the 
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militants’ interpretation is certainly the wrong one – again, scholarly consensus among the 
mufassireen cannot be ignored.169   
It has already been written, but bears repeating, that this thesis has not attempted to 
prove that only one legitimate interpretation of Islam exists.  It has however demonstrated, 
through renowned, respected, and accepted scholarship, that militant Islamists have just as 
valid of an interpretation as anyone else claiming to be Muslim.  This fact should prompt the 
United States to abandon the approach that the Departments of Defense and State have taken 
over the last five years and pursue a PSYOP approach better designed to influence the 
emotions, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of our militant Islamist 
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A DIFFERENT APPROACH 
 
 The United States needs to ideologically bankrupt militant Islamism in a fashion 
similar to how it delegitimized the ideology of the Soviet Union.171  Obviously a host of 
other factors both political and economic led to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, but 
the United States and its allies nonetheless waged relentless psychological operations against 
the USSR and exposed many of its core truths to be false.  Anti-Soviet PSYOP campaigns 
resulted in “lowered morale in the Communist ranks, induced defections, [and] increased 
people’s readiness to assist the West.”172  This chapter of the thesis is not intended to be a 
detailed explanation of a fully developed approach to psychological operations that 
guarantees to turn militant Islamists and would-be jihadis from their violent and hateful 
ways.  Nor does the author intend for this chapter to be too general or vague so as to be 
useless.  The intent of this chapter is to serve as a framework within which policy makers and 
military leaders could develop an effective psychological operations plan to expose many of 
militant Islamism’s core truths to be false. 
The previous sections of this thesis may have left the reader questioning the 
difference, practically speaking, between an ideology that actually commands its adherents to 
violently subjugate people and an ideology that only sounds like it commands its adherents to 
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violently subjugate people.173  When reading Surah 9:29, for example, one cannot help but 
wrestle with understanding the difference between an ideology that commands followers to 
“fight those who do not believe in Allah” and really means it and an ideology that commands 
“fight those who do not believe in Allah” but does not really mean it.  The same intellectual 
wrestling match likely happens often with Western-minded Muslims.  The writings of those 
considered qualified to provide an authoritative explanation of the Quranic text, the 
mufassireen, seem to consider Islam to be the former of the two ideologies – ie. the plain 
reading of the text is the correct understanding.  Could the prominent mufassireen referenced 
in this paper be mistaken in many of their explanations of the text?  Sure, that is certainly a 
possibility.  Islam has indeed evolved and moderate interpretations exist which very likely 
make up the weight of current scholarly opinion.  However this does not negate the fact that 
there is legitimate scholarly support from 630 AD to present for the more militant 
understanding of the ideology.  Furthermore, any “evolution” of the ideology can be 
dismissed by militants as bid’ah, as discussed at the end of Chapter VI. 
Even if it were to be granted that true Quranic Islam is theoretically peaceful, the 
surface-level reading of numerous Quranic passages, various proclamations of Muhammad 
himself, and recognized authoritative commentaries often make it indistinguishable from an 
ideology of brutal oppression and cruelty.  Therefore, at the risk of offending certain 
sensibilities, this researcher submits that the threat from militant Islamism is not rooted in 
simply a militant interpretation of the Islamic text, but is necessarily rooted in the text itself.  
If this offends the reader, return to Chapter VI and attempt to explain the text better than 
those who are recognized by the ummah, and literally qualified, to provide an authoritative 
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explanation.  Revisit the letter to Al-Baghdadi by 172 scholars and take note how the 
scholars condemn Al-Baghdadi and militant Islamists for cherry-picking verses and then 
proceed to do the very same thing to support their interpretation.174  If proof-texting and 
cherry-picking can be used equally as effectively by scholars from divergent interpretations 
of the ideology, one militant and one peaceful, then the problem lies not with the 
interpretation, but with the text. 
Based on the mufassireen’s authoritative explanations, brutal oppression and cruelty 
are accurate descriptions of many Quranic passages.  This statement in no way equates to an 
assertion that all or even the majority of professing Muslims are therefore cruel and brutal 
oppressors, or even that the ideology is itself indeed cruel and brutal.  Again, no such 
assertion is being made in this paper and, on the contrary, it has already been granted in this 
chapter that true Quranic Islam is theoretically peaceful.   The fact still remains that an 
ideology that is actually peaceful, but is perceived by many adherents and well-respected 
scholars to command violence, should not be considered less of a threat than an ideology that 
sounds violent because it actually is.  In light of the fact that respected scholars can be cited 
to validly support both the moderate and militant interpretations of the text, attempting to 
promote one interpretation over another, in an absolute sense, would be wasted effort.  
However, if the text that fuels both interpretations were to be refuted and revealed as being 
altogether false, then it logically follows that any interpretation of the text, most importantly 
the militant one, would also therefore be false and worthy of abandonment.   
The “incorrect interpretation” card can no longer be played; militant Islamists offer a 
comprehensive intellectual architecture based on established Quranic doctrine to support 
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their beliefs which are no less legitimate than alternative interpretations promoting a 
moderate approach to the text. 175   In the card game of proof texting, militant Islamists may 
not hold the royal flush, but at the very least their bluff is extremely effective.  If the Quran 
were proven false, it follows that militant Islamism would also be discredited as a valid 
ideology.  In 1979, Brigadier General S. K. Malik, then General in the Pakistani Army, wrote 
in his book the Quranic Concept of War that the only center-of-gravity in warfare is “the soul 
of [the] enemy, the faith system of the enemy.”176  He wrote that the faith system of the 
enemy must be crushed in order to win in war.177  The author of this paper agrees.   
The sensitive nature of a government-sponsored campaign aimed at refuting a 
religious ideology, or as the general put it “crushing the faith system of the enemy,” would 
necessitate a special program, the existence of which would have to be concealed from both 
the general public and specifically the target audience, in order to be effective. 178  The 
actions stemming from such a campaign should never be connected back to the source.  A 
convincing narrative would have to be developed in order to deflect culpability onto a third 
party which could be another nation state or a fabricated international ideological affinity 
group.   
Instead of shutting down militant Islamist websites or social media pages, these 
platforms could be hacked by a notional affinity group and used to present ideology-refuting 
ideas.  Militant Islamist propaganda would be replaced by information aimed at sowing seeds 
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of doubt into the minds of the militants, not by challenging their interpretation of the 
ideology as that has already been demonstrated to be an ineffective and self-defeating 
approach, but by challenging the text itself as well as the credentials of the original 
promulgator of the ideology.   An effective campaign should “create confusion among enemy 
combatants and supporters, exacerbate divisiveness in order to cause the enemy to fight 
against itself, and destroy the morale of the enemy and its supporters.”179  As is the case with 
kinetic targeting (warheads on foreheads) which provides parameters for collateral damage, 
this ideological targeting would also require parameters for “collateral influence” as non-
militants would inevitably be exposed to information stemming from this PSYOP campaign.  
The effectiveness of this PSYOP approach is based on one observation and one key 
assumption.  First, as a matter of observation, it is not difficult to find numerous men from 
various backgrounds willing to die for a lie if they are convinced it is true and especially if it 
is believed to be divinely inspired truth.  It is assumed, however, that it would be extremely 
difficult to find even one man willing to die for a lie knowing full well that it is a lie or at 
least very probably a lie.  This author’s proposed psychological operations approach against 
militant Islamism would aim for somewhere in between.  While it would admittedly be a 
difficult task to completely de-convert somebody from their deeply help beliefs, it would be 
quite feasible to sow enough doubt to at least stifle certain behavior while the targeted 
audience attempts to process newly acquired information that presents a real challenge to its 
deeply held beliefs.   
The next logical step in this research is to provide examples of information that could 
be used to challenge the foundations of militant Islamism.  This researcher has considered 
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tactics that range from the use of simple, empirical facts and biological truths to more 
theologically complex topics.  For starters, a simple tactic could involve challenging the 
divine origin of the Quran.  Dr. Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi, former Director of the S.H. 
Institute of Islamic Studies at the University of Kashmir, wrote the following praise about the 
Quran in his 2003 book titled World Religions and Islam: A Critical Study, Part 1: 
The Quran is unrivalled in its recording and 
preservation.  The astonishing fact about this 
book of Allah is that it has remained unchanged 
even to a dot over the past fourteen hundred 
years.  No scholar has questioned the fact that 
the Quran today is the same as it was 
revealed…Today, the Quran is the only 
authentic and complete book of Allah.  Allah is 
protecting it from being lost, corrupted or 
concealed.180 
 
If a scholar and former university director of Islamic Studies believes such a claim, it is not 
surprising that many, if not the majority, of Muslims around the world, including militants, 
believe the same.  The claim is that all Qurans are identical and that such preservation is 
proof of the Quran’s divine origin.  A popular Islamic guide for non-Muslims, A Brief 
Illustrated Guide to Understanding Islam, commended for being “reviewed and edited by 
many professors and well-educated people” 181 also states that “the Quran exists only in the 
Arabic in which it was revealed.”182  While this section is not meant to be a fully exhaustive 
study of the history of the Quran, it will demonstrate that this oft-repeated claim about the 
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Quran is indeed false and easily refuted.  The point of such refutation in a PSYOP campaign 
would be to force budding jihadists to question which of their other beliefs may also be false.  
The end goal would be to remove their eagerness to commit acts of terror in the name of a 
now possibly uncertain belief system.  Dr. Keith Small, a lecturer and researcher at the 
London School of Theology, noted that “early and medieval Islamic scholarship was quite 
free in its recognition of textual variation and missing portions of the Quran and did not tend 
to make claims of perfect transmission.”183  Throughout Muhammad’s lifetime, his closest 
companions recorded his recitations in writing.  After Muhammad died, these varying 
records of recitations “became authoritative versions in their own right.”184  Cyril Glassé, an 
American convert to Islam, wrote in his acclaimed New Encyclopedia of Islam that “certain 
variant readings existed and, indeed, persisted and increased as the companions who had 
memorized the text died, and because the inchoate Arabic script, lacking vowel signs and 
even the necessary diacriticals to distinguish between certain consonants, was inadequate.”185  
The well-known American Muslim scholar Abu Ammaar Yasir Qadhi explained in his book 
An Introduction to the Sciences of the Qur’aan that there are currently five qira’aat 
(readings/recitations) of the Quran in Arabic today.186  Muhammad himself, according to 
Sahih al-Bukhari, the most authentic of the hadith collections, stated that the Quran was 
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revealed to be recited in seven different ways.187  Even today one can purchase various 
versions of the Arabic Quran.  Some are more difficult to find or simply rarer than others, but 
nonetheless they exist.  A psychological effect could be elicited by bombarding militant 
Islamist social media sites with pictures of the various readings of the same passages from 
different Arabic Qurans.  For a militant Islamist/would-be jihadi who has been told his whole 
life about, and subsequently believed in, the existence of one Quran, perfectly preserved by 
Allah throughout time since its revelation, to then see with his own eyes on his favorite jihadi 
propaganda website a side-by-side comparison of at least five variant Quranic readings, it is 
plausible to assess that it would arouse in him questions about a book he previously left 
unchallenged.  By presenting him with a refutation of something that he has likely believed 
his entire life, this tactic would aim to foster enough doubt in his heart and mind to dissuade 
him from taking any action that may, as he would perceive it, have eternal consequences. 
 Many Muslims, the militant jihadist type included, are unaware of Muhammad’s 
many scientific insights.  Others are actually quick to point out the instances of scientific 
accuracy in the Quran, proclaiming it impossible that an illiterate, seventh-century leader 
could have revealed these scientific insights without divine revelation.  The majority of 
Muslims however seem to be either completely unaware of, or perhaps simply turn a blind 
eye to, Muhammad’s numerous inaccurate and easily refutable scientific claims.  As the 
mouthpiece for the creator of the universe, Muhammad certainly should not be excused for 
erroneous explanations of any natural phenomenon.  It is here that the proposed 
psychological operations campaign could force militant Islamists to question their prophet 
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leader.  As an example, in Surah 86:5-7, the following revelation of Allah is recorded: “So let 
man observe from what he was created.  He was created from a fluid, ejected, emerging from 
between the backbone and the ribs.”  Some modern-day Islamic apologists assert that the 
Arabic words of this Quranic passage, such as that of “rib,” have very broad and diverse 
definitions and are so ambiguous as to preclude a precise definition. 188   However the 
recognized preeminent Islamic scholar, Ibn Kathir, is not so ambiguous in his explanation of 
the meaning of this passage.  Ibn Kathir explained that, per this passage in the Quran, “the 
sexual fluid that comes out bursting forth from the man and the woman [proceeds from] the 
backbone (or lions) of the man and the ribs of the woman, which is referring to her chest.”189  
This fluid is “yellow and fine in texture [and a] child will not be born except from of them 
(their sexual fluids).”190  In addition, according to the authentic hadith of Sahih al-Bukhari, 
in response to a question posed by one of his followers as to why a child sometimes 
resembles its father and other times its maternal uncle, Muhammad claimed that the angel 
Gabriel told him the following: 
As for the resemblance of the child to its 
parents: If a man has sexual intercourse with his 
wife and gets discharge first, the child will 
resemble the father, and if the woman gets 
discharge first, the child will resemble her.191 
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Either the angel Gabriel, who supposedly revealed the entire Quran to Muhammad, was 
completely ignorant of human sexual reproduction or Muhammad was lying.  Again, many 
practicing Muslims, more importantly in this case militant Islamists, are unfamiliar with such 
teachings.  While neither of the unusual claims by Muhammad or Allah is likely enough to 
cause mass apostasy among the militants, mass apostasy is not the measure of success in this 
proposed PSYOP campaign against militant Islamism.  The goal is to arouse questions and 
cause sufficient doubt to illicit a change in behavior, namely to lessen the commitment the 
militants have to their belief system.  Unlike challenging the militant Islamist interpretation 
of Islam, an interpretation that, while “wrong”, has been demonstrated to be well established 
and easily supported by authoritative documents, challenging instead the legitimacy of those 
documents by means of an internal critique would almost certainly prove more effective in 
causing militant Islamists to question their beliefs.  While a jihadist leader could justify acts 
of terror by pointing to seemingly violent passages in the Quran supported by the 
explanations of the mufassireen, he would have more difficulty in justifying the legitimacy of 
a supposed prophet who taught that a child’s appearance was determined by which of his 
parents reached climax first. 
The goal of challenging the prophethood of Muhammad through a targeted PSYOP 
campaign would not be to prove to every one of his followers that he was undoubtedly not a 
prophet, but instead to simply sow enough doubt, particularly into the minds of his militant 
followers, so that they are less willing to die for what they previously assessed to be certain 
truth.  Another approach to this tactic of challenging the “leader” of militant Islamists would 
be an appeal to the Jewish Torah, specifically Deuteronomy 18.  The reader should 
understand that verses 15 through 18 of the 18th chapter of the Book of Deuteronomy are 
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often appealed to by Muslim apologists as proof that the ancient Jewish texts themselves 
predicted the coming of the Prophet Muhammad.  This “proof” supports the Islamic narrative 
that Islam is the ultimate culmination of the Abrahamic faiths of Judaism and Christianity 
and Muhammad is the final prophet.   The Quran itself states that Muhammad is written 
about in the pages of the Torah and Gospels.192  Logically, if the Torah and the Gospels lack 
any mention or suggestion of Muhammad, then the Quran is false and militant Islamism fails.  
Muhammad therefore must be in the Torah and, per many Muslim scholars, the place of his 
mentioning is Deuteronomy 18.    The above-mentioned popular Islamic guide for non-
Muslims, A Brief Illustrated Guide to Understanding Islam, references Deuteronomy 18:15-
18 in a section titled “Biblical Prophecies on the Advent of Muhammad, the Prophet of 
Islam.”193  This is important because many Muslims today claim that the texts of the other 
Abrahamic faiths have been corrupted with time and are no longer reliable.  However, by 
appealing to Deuteronomy, Muslims actually attest to the book’s legitimacy, or at the very 
least to the legitimacy of chapter 18 as we have it today.  It is at this point that the Islamic 
texts themselves can be used to cast doubt on the prophethood of Muhammad.  The History 
of al-Tabari details an event in the life of Muhammad that is quite revealing.194  Desiring to 
reconcile himself to his people, the pagan tribe of Quraysh, Muhammad delivered a 
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revelation from Allah mentioning the approved intercession of al-Lat, al-Uzza and Manat, 
pagan goddesses.195  The Quran itself also includes a passage about the three goddesses.  In 
Surah 53 (An-Najm) Allah asks, “So have you considered al-Lat and al-'Uzza?  And Manat, 
the third - the other one?”  While this Surah does not mention the intercession of the 
goddesses, the authentic hadith of al-Bukhari records that “the Prophet performed a 
prostration when he finished reciting Surah an-Najm [Surah 53], and all the Muslims and 
pagans and Jinns [demons] and human beings prostrated along with him.”196  The reason for 
the prostration of the pagans is explained by al-Tabari:  
When Quraysh heard this [the revelation], they 
rejoiced and were happy and delighted at the 
way in which he [Muhammad] spoke of their 
gods, and they listened to him, while the 
Muslims, having complete trust in their Prophet 
in respect of the messages which he brought 
from God, did not suspect him of error, illusion, 
or mistake…Those polytheists of the Quraysh 
and others who were in the mosque likewise 
prostrated themselves because of the reference 
to their gods which they had heard.197 
 
As a result of Muhammad speaking favorably of other gods, he received chastisement from 
the angel Gabriel: 
Then Gabriel came to the Messenger of God and 
said, “Muhammad, what have you done?  You 
have recited to the people that which I did not 
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bring to you from God, and you have said that 
which was not said to you.”198 
 
While some Muslim scholars reject the account of al-Tabari as being fabricated, the Quran 
nonetheless contains the following verse that appears to be a type of justification from Allah 
for Muhammad’s erroneous revelation: 
And We did not send before you any messenger 
or prophet except that when he spoke [or 
recited], Satan threw into it [some 
misunderstanding]. But Allah abolishes that 
which Satan throws in; then Allah makes 
precise His verses. And Allah is Knowing and 
Wise.199 
 
The preeminent Islamic scholar, Ibn Kathir, in his tafsir expounded on this Quranic verse by 
explaining that “Ibn `Abbas said (in [Muhammad’s] recitation of the revelation) ‘When he 
spoke, the Shaytan [demons] threw (some falsehood) into his speech, but Allah abolished 
that which the Shaytan threw in.’”200  Between the Quran, the hadith, the history of Al-
Tabari, and the exegesis of Ibn Kathir, the historical evidence of this story is compelling.  
The significance of this story is found in the very same book and chapter of the Torah that 
supposedly predicts the coming of Muhammad.   In Deuteronomy 18:20, two verses after the 
supposed mentioning of Muhammad, God proclaimed to His people “the prophet who 
presumes to speak a word in My name that I have not commanded him to speak, or who 
speaks in the name of other gods, that same prophet shall die.”  The chapter goes on to 
explain that such a prophet has spoken presumptuously and is not to be feared; he was to be 
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regarded as a false prophet.  Therefore, the situation is such that if Deuteronomy 18 is true 
then Muhammad is a false prophet because, according to the Quran, all prophets have spoken 
falsehoods from Satan in God’s name and Deuteronomy 18 proclaims that such prophets are 
false prophets.  If Deuteronomy 18 is false (ie. corrupted text) then the Quran is also false 
because the Quran explicitly states that Muhammad is mentioned in the Torah, with 
Deuteronomy 18 alone supposedly fulfilling that claim.  Either way, the ideology of militant 
Islamists fails.  Again, while this is not a silver bullet guaranteed to make every militant 
Islamist an apostate, it may serve well to generate confusion and doubt, destroy morale, and 
potentially create in-fighting as militants begin to question their prophet and the ideology that 
he brought to the world. 
Regardless of the specific tactic taken, the goal of each would be the same – to 
implant into the minds of would-be jihadists the idea of “if this [enter foundational 
ideological principle] is erroneous, what else have I been taught that is also false?”  When a 
militant Islamist begins to doubt the divine origin of his sacred text he will begin to doubt the 
divine sanctioning of his militant behavior and “a mind troubled by doubt cannot focus on 
the course to victory.”201  For militant Islamists, victory means the subjugation by any means 
necessary of kafiruna (unbelievers).  Their victory is what this PSYOP approach aims to 
prevent.  It may seem quixotic to think that a PSYOP campaign could overcome a lifetime of 
conditioning in order to affect how a person, namely a militant Islamist, views his deeply 
held beliefs.  However, a research paper in the journal The Muslim World demonstrates the 
possibility of overcoming such conditioning.  The researchers studied the conversion 
narratives of 233 former Muslims and found that four of the top nine intellectual and 
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ideological motivations for leaving the ideology included: the problematic nature of the 
Quran, the character of the Prophet, the illogical and unscientific aspects of Islam, and the 
dubious historicity of the Quran.202  Of the 233, 60% converted to Christianity, 28% claimed 
to be either atheist or agnostic, and 12% adopted other unspecified worldviews; given the 
nature of the sources of this data, additional research would need to be conducted in order to 
more accurately determine the most popular conversion destination.203  Such information, 
however, could help determine the weight of effort given to the three different approaches 
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 In all reality, the approach to Psychological Operations for countering militant 
Islamism proposed in this thesis paper is not appropriate for the United States, at least not yet 
and not for the foreseeable future.  If the United States’ recent efforts against the Islamic 
State over the past decade are any indication of its PSYOP strategy against the overarching 
militant Islamist ideology and the future course it intends to take against militant Islamist 
organizations, then the United States is simply wasting time and effort.  While kinetic 
operations have physically liquidated the Islamic State’s caliphate and subsequently 
diminished the flow of foreign fighters and cyber operations have degraded their online 
presence, our attempts to refute their ideology and actually change minds (instead of simply 
blowing them up) have been wasted efforts.  Unfortunately, pseudo-altruism along with the 
almost suffocating political-correctness that imbues contemporary American society, to 
include our national security organs, would make it difficult to build a team with the 
necessary skills, resources, and resolve to effectively implement the type of PSYOP 
campaign described in Chapter IX.  Even if such a team were built, somewhere along the 
chain of permissions and approvals would be an individual who considers protecting feelings 
more important than protecting national security.  Such an individual would inevitably leak 
information about the operation simply because he or she considered it wrong to persuade 
others, via sophisticated influence operations, that someone proclaiming to be a prophet 
approximately 1,400 years ago was himself wrong.   
87 
The very same adversary, against whom the United States engaged in relentless and 
thoroughly criticizing information and psychological warfare, appears to be ripe to employ 
the tactics outlined above and is possibly the sole force capable of employing non-traditional 
and controversial methods to discredit militant Islamism.  Approximately 20 years ago, the 
distinguished scholar of Russian thought, Timothy Thomas, wrote:  
“[Russians understand] information operations from a cultural, 
ideological, historical, scientific and philosophical viewpoint.  
Different prisms of logic may offer totally different 
conclusions about an information operation’s intent, purpose, 
lethality, or encroachment on sovereignty; and this logic may 
result in new methods to attack targets in entirely non-
traditional and creative ways.”204 
 
Russian state and non-state actors have already proven their willingness and ability to exploit 
“history, culture, language, nationalism and more to carry out cyber enhanced [information 
operations] with much wider objectives [than just deception].”205  Russian military leaders 
have written extensively about the need in information warfare to control and depress one’s 
opponent morally and psychologically.206  Russian doctrine stipulates that this is 
accomplished by conveying “specially prepared information to incline [opponents] to 
voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by [Moscow].” 207  This is not to say 
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that the Kremlin has eliminated the jihadi threat by means of PSYOP.  Moscow’s approach to 
anti-militant-Islamism PSYOP is often equally as misguided as the United States’.  However, 
Russia has demonstrated in its doctrine the willingness to exploit any and all information 
related capabilities and psychological domains to achieve its goals.  In addition, Moscow has 
mastered the concept of ambiguous warfare, through which it is able to obscure its direct 
participation in conflicts by employing troops and proxies in deceptive and confusing 
manners as demonstrated by “Little Green Men” in Ukraine and the 2007 cyber-attack on 
Estonia.208  This capability is vital to the effective employment of the PSYOP approach 
proposed in this paper.  The only adjustment required on the part of the Kremlin, or 
whichever state or affinity group undertakes this campaign, would be to exchange 
disinformation for accurate information.  Whereas Russia has become notorious for its 
employment of trolls (human-run online profiles) to exploit social media “in order to plant, 
disseminate and lend credibility to disinformation,” this new approach would require trolls to 
plant and disseminate easily verifiable and true information.209   
Other information related capabilities such as strategic communications, electronic 
warfare, website hijacking, and a whole host of other disciplines that Moscow executes so 
well, could be employed in conjunction with PSYOP to influence the perception, beliefs, and 
behavior of the militant Islamist adversary.  This author recognizes that anything that the 
Russian Ministry of Defense can do, the United States Department of Defense could likely 
do better.  Nevertheless, he also is also convinced that contemporary Western ideals, perhaps 
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specifically contemporary American ideals, while admirable in many aspects, are actually an 
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